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L JNTRODUCTION
Pharmaceutical legislation and regulation in the United States are recent
phenomena. Indeed, before the early part of the twentieth century, the
industry was entirely free of external controls.' Congress first enacted
legislation with the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906,2 which focused on
the purity and quality of products and the accuracy of their branding.3
Legal control over the efficacy and safety of drugs was strengthened
substantially through the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938,4
the antecedent of the existing FDA drug approval process. The rigor of
external controls was expanded again with the passage of the Drug
Amendments of 1962, which, created the phases of clinical testing
presently required for the approval and marketing of new drugs.6 Thus over
a period of less than 60 years, the pharmaceuticals market has been
transformed to a closely regulated environment. As the FDA developed
and grew through the 1970s, 7 the bureaucratization of rule over the drug
industry expanded apace.'
In contrast, the 1980s and 1990s have brought a retrenchment from the
trend of escalating administrative requirements in pharmaceuticals
marketing. The deregulatory period of the Reagan administration9 brought

1. See Eric Lindemann, ImportingAIDS Drugs:FoodandDrugAdministrationPolicyand
its Limitations, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'LL. &ECON. 133, 133 (1994) (dating federal regulation of
pharmaceutical industry to the first decade of the twentieth century).
2. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915,34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938).
3. See id. §§ 1-12, 34 Stat. at 768-72.
4. Pub. L. No. 52-717,52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392
(1997)).
5. Pub. L. No. 87-781,76 Stat. 780(1962) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C. §§ 301-381 (1997)).
6. See id.
7. See United States v. Parkinson, 240 F.2d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1956) (observing the
"tendency of executive agencies to expand their field of operations").
8. This trend was so extreme that one commentator refers to the traditional FDA approval
process, developed in the Kefauver-Harris Amendments, as "bureaucratic arteriosclerosis." See
PHILIPK. HOWARD, THE DEATH OFCOMMON SENSE: HOWLAWISSUFHCATJNGAMERIcA84 (1994)
(quoting Louis Jaffe).
9. See Michael C. Dorf& Charles F. Sabel,A ConstitutionofDemocraticExperimentalisra,
98 CoUiJM. L. REV. 267, 361 (1998) (associating the Reagan administration with an era of
deregulation).
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changes to the prescription drug industry,"° largely triggered by activists'
demands for expedited marketing of new HIV and AIDS treatments. 1"
These two decades have been a time of intense reform in the areas of
pharmaceutical legislation and regulation. 2
Many of the components of this era of change have taken the form of
what I have labeled "liberalizations"-movements toward increased
consumer access to drugs and related products, and expanded freedom in
the manufacture and marketing of those products."3 Early AIDS-era
reforms 4 included the development of such processes as use of
investigational new drugs for treatment, 5 fast-track approvals, 6 paralleltrack investigational new drugs, 7 and drug approvals based on surrogate
marker data.'8 In addition, Congress passed the Dietary Supplement Health
and Education Act of 1994,'9 which further deregulated the already loosely
governed market for dietary supplements.20 More recently, regulatory and
legislative liberalizations have focused on the increasingly complex issue
of pharmaceutical marketing.2

10. See Jeffrey D. Winchester, Note, Section 8(c) of the ProposedRestatement (Third) of
Torts: Is It Really What the DoctorOrdered?, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 644, 681 (1997) (observing
"recent political emphasis on a 'laissez faire' approach to agency regulation of the pharmaceutical
industry").
11. See Phillip J. Hilts, How theAIDS CrisisMade Drug RegulatorsSpeed Up, N.Y. TIMEs,
Sept. 24, 1989, at E5 (noting the connection between AIDS activism and FDA reforms).
12. See Note, FDA Reform andthe EuropeanMedicines EvaluationAgency, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 2009 (1995) (discussing this recent deregulation of the pharmaceutical industry, as well as
present and future initiatives).
13. See Steven R. Salbu, The FDA and PublicAccess to New Drugs:AppropriateLevels of
Scrutiny in the Wake of HIV, AIDS, and the Diet Drug Debacle, 79 B.U. L. REv. (forthcoming
1999).
14. See Jeff Nesmith, Recall Raises Questions Over Speed of FDA Drug Approvals, Cox
NEws SERVICE, June 23, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File. While these
reforms can be traced to the efforts of HIV and AIDS activists who sought easier access to new
treatments in the 1980s, they are also said to result from aggressive lobbyingby the pharmaceutical
industry during the same period. See id.
15. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.1 (1998).
16. See Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations:
Procedures for Drugs Intended to Treat Life-Threatening and Severely Debilitating Illnesses, 53
Fed. Reg. 41,516 (1988).
17. See 57 Fed. Reg. 13,250, 13,257-58 (1992).
18. See 57 Fed. Reg. 58,942 (1992).
19. Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 21 U.S.C.).
20. See Margaret Gilhooley, HerbalRemedies andDietarySupplements: The Boundariesof
Drug Claims and Freedom of Choice, 49 FLA. L. REV. 663, 679-706 (1997) (examining these
changes).
21. This increasing complexity is due largely to the role of the Internet as a source of
information, and questions that arise concerning whether and when posting data on the Internet
comprises marketing efforts. This challenge has led the FDA to consider issuing general guidance
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For example, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has initiated
changes over the past few years that have dramatically broadened the ways
in which drug manufacturers advertise pharmaceutical products directly to
consumers.' Today, pharmaceutical companies place ads on television,
radio and the Internet, for the first time directly informing patients about
the purposes, functions, and advantages of various prescription drug
products.' Although the FDA continues to fight what it regards as abusive
practices,' its general tendency during the past two decades has been
toward relaxation rather than enhanced control.'
This recent regulatory movement in the direction of expanded
marketing discretion has been matched by a parallel federal legislative
initiative. In 1997, Congress enacted the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997 (Modernization Act),2 6 the first major
congressional legislation in the area ofpharmaceutical law in recent years.
While the law is comprehensive, covering a wide range of subjects related

on Internet use in this regard. See Jill Wechsler, CommunicationsSlowdown, PHARM. ExEc., July
1997, at 20.
In regard to FDA restrictions on the advertising of drug products, either to professionals or to
the public, interactive computer technology raises difficult and intriguing new questions. For
example, when a drug manufacturer includes information and links on its home page, at what point
does the information contained or cross-linked qualify as marketing of products and particular uses
of products? Are the drug companies reaching out to the public in a form of advertisement, or are
they simply providing them with a resource they can examine at their own initiation? The FDA
began examining these complex issues during a two-day conference it held in October of 1996. See
James G. Dickinson, No Washington Cheerfor Drug Manufacturers in 1997, MED. MKTG. &
MEDIA, Dec. 1996, at 12.
The challenges of these issues are further complicated by the need for investigators and
manufacturers to communicate, the utility of the Internet in facilitating these communications, and
the access that consumers have to much information shared over the Internet. For discussion of
these aspects of the problem, see Marilyn A. Moberg et al., Surfing the Net in Shallow Waters:
ProductLiability Concerns and Advertising on the Internet,53 FOOD & DRUG L.J 213, 221-22
(1998) (discussing these issues); see also Marc J. Scheineson, Legal Overview of Likely FDA
Regulation ofInternet Promotion,51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 697 (1996).
22. See generally Lars Noah, Advertising PrescriptionDrugs to Consumers:Assessing the
Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141 (1997).
23. See Michael C. Allen, Comment, Medicine GoesMadisonAvenue: An Evaluationofthe
Effect ofDirect-to-ConsumerPharmaceuticalAdvertisingon the LearnedIntermediaryDoctrine,
20 CAMPBELL. REv. 113, 115 (1997).
24. See, e.g., Natalie Hopkinson, FDA Delays Rules Aimed at CurbingDrug Promotions,
WALL ST. J., July 20, 1998, at B8 (concerning possible prospective FDA efforts to prohibit drug
manufacturers that purchase pharmacy benefit management companies from using the latters'
patient lists for marketing mailings).
25. See Steven R. Salbu, RegulationofDrug TreatmentsforHlVandAIDS:A Contractarian
Model ofAccess, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 401,410-18 (1994) (describing relaxed FDA control during
this period).
26. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1997).
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to both drugs and medical devices, 7 some particular provisions have the
potential to alter substantially the ways in which pharmaceuticals are
marketed in the United States.
This Article focuses on one such provision of the Modernization
Act-the limited authorization, for the first time, of "off-label" marketing
of drugs. The Article describes and critiques various off-label practices, in
order to provide an assessment of present policies and recommendations
for future legislative and regulatory initiatives.
Specifically, Part I explains what off-label use, prescription,
marketing, and promotion entail. It then examines the arguments for
legalization made by proponents of off-label practices, as well as the
arguments against legalization made by opponents of off-label practices.
Part II describes the major provisions of the Modernization Act that
liberalize off-label processes. Part IV is an effort to resolve the conflicting
positions outlined earlier in the Article, by assessing the validity and
relative strengths of each position. The Article closes with Part V, which
summarizes the major points and propositions.
II. OFF-LABEL USE, PRBSCRMTION, AND
MAREEING/PROMOTION OF DRUGS

This Part is divided into three Subparts. The first Subpart briefly
defines the term "off-label," explaining the legislative and regulatory
context in which the phrase was developed. The second Subpart defines
with specificity a number of the terms that employ the modifier "off-label."
The third Subpart discusses the controversy over various off-label
activities and functions.
A. Defining "Off-Label"
The term "off-label" comes by inference from congressional legislation
and FDA regulations concerning drug labeling. The Food Drug and
Cosmetic Act of 1938 first required drug companies to label
pharmaceutical products with various directions and warnings." Detailed
27. In addition to the off-label marketing portions of the statute that are directly addressed
in this article, sections of the legislation concern user fees that finance expedited FDA review,
pediatric drug studies, fast-track studies and approvals, streamlining of clinical research, pilot and
small scale manufacture of drugs, exemptions for investigational devices, and food regulation
improvements, among others. See id.
28. See FederalFood, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 502(f), 52 Stat. 1040,1051 (1938)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1997)). Labeling requirements have developed and
changed over the intervening period. Most importantly, distinctions have been made between overthe-counter drugs, which are labeled with directions and warnings directed to the consumer, and
prescription drugs, which are labeled for only the physician, who serves as "learned intermediary"
between the pharmaceutical manufacturer and the patient. See id.; see also Charles J. Walsh et al.,
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regulations tell manufacturers what must be included in a drug's label,
including things like information necessary for safe and effective use,2 9 as
well as warnings, precautions, clinical pharmacology, indications,
contraindications, and adverse reactions.' The regulations are intended to
ensure that the drugs and their promotional literature contain accurate and
complete information regarding approved use and risks." Although the
ultimate goal is consumer protection, prescription drug labels today are
aimed at physicians, who have held a longstanding position in American
jurisprudence as "learned intermediaries" between manufacturers and

users." FDA-approved labeling is included not only as a product insert, but
also as an entry in the Physician'sDesk Reference.33

When the agency approves a new drug, it does so for specific purposes
associated with the clinical trial findings that supported the drug's
application. Logic tells us that, since the universe of possible unapproved

uses is infinite, it would be difficult for the FDA to promulgate labeling
requirements for all uses beyond those for which the drug was approved.'
Accordingly, pharmaceutical companies are required to convey, in the

drug's formal labeling, information regarding only those uses for which the

drug was approved.35
By inference, all other uses therefore have come to be designated as
"off-label" uses.36 If a manufacturer wishes an off-label use to be added to

The Learned IntermediaryDoctrine:The CorrectPrescriptionforDrugLabeling, 48 RUTGERS L.
REV. 821(1996) (discussing this history).
29. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.56(a) (1998).
30. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.56(d) (1998).
31. See Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentanglingthe "Right to Know"from the
"Need to Know" about Consumer ProductHazards, 11 YALE J.ON REG. 293, 326-33 (1994)
(discussing the labeling requirements for prescription drugs).
32. See Margaret Gilhooley, Learned Intermediaries, Prescription Drugs, and Patient
Information, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 633 (1986) (discussing this concept).
33. See Edmund Polubinski, Hm,Note, Closing the Channelsof Communication:A First
Amendment Analysis ofthe FDA'sPolicyon ManufacturerPromotionof "Off-Label" Use, 83 VA.
L. REV. 991,995 (1997) ("he final labelingas approved forms thepackage insert that accompanies
the drug to market and also appears in the Physician'sDesk Reference.").
34. Of course, a middle ground is possible here. For example, the FDA could promulgate
informational requirements not only relating to approved uses, but also foreseeable uses, common
unapproved uses, etc. Nonetheless, it remains true that it would be logistically impossible for the
FDA to require information be given on all unapproved uses, since the range of such uses has no
limits.
35. See David W. Opderbeck, How Should FDA Regulate PrescriptionDrugPromotionon
the Internet?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 47, 55 (1998) ("[R]egulations prohibit labeling listing 'offlabel' uses for which the drug is not indicated.").
36. See William L. Christopher, Off-Label Drug Prescription:Filling the Regulatory
Vacuum, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 248 (1993) (supplying the following definitional guidance:
"Using an approved drug to treat a disease that is not indicated on its label, but is closely related
to an indicated disease, treating unrelated, unindicated diseases, and treating the indicated disease
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a drug's labeling, it must apply to the FDA for approval as it would for a
new drug." Accordingly, Professor Merrill has observed that "the
manufacturer of a drug with potential multiple uses confronts the prospect
of having to surmount the obstacles to FDA approval several times before
it can exploit the full market potential of the drug."3 8 Of course, inclusion
of a new use in the drug's labeling may not increase sales, especially if offlabel applications are already well known and off-label use is already
widespread. 9 In such instances, companies have little incentive to apply
4
for labeling authorization under tedious and expensive FDA procedures. 0
B. Defining Specific Kinds of Off-Label Activities
This Subpart briefly defines and examines the three basic kinds of offlabel activities--off-label use, off-label prescription, and off-label
marketing and promotion.
1. Off-Label Use
Off-label use of a prescription drug occurs whenever the consumer of
the drug uses it in a manner that varies in some way from the instructions
in the drug's labeling, which are limited to FDA-approved uses.4
Logically, such off-label uses can occur with or without the knowledge or
consent of the prescribing physician, and with or without the
manufacturer's knowledge or encouragement of the variant use. The most
typical off-label uses are use by persons other than those for whom the
drug was approved, use in dosages other than the approved dosages, use
for conditions other than those indicated in the labeling, and use in
unapproved combination with other drugs.42
It would be logistically impracticable, although not technically
impossible, for Congress or the FDA to ban the off-label use of drugs. This

but varying from the indicated dosage, regimen, or patient population may all be considered offlabel use.").
37. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70-.71 (1998).
38. Richard A. Merrill, TheArchitectureof Government Regulation ofMedical Products,82
VA. L. REV. 1753, 1853-54 (1996).
39. See Kaspar J. Stoffelmayr, ProductsLiability and "Off-Label" Uses of Prescription
Drugs,63 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 277 (1996) (observing that adding an off-label use to a label has
little effect on sales when doctors already know of the off-label application).

40. See id. (noting manufacturers frequently decline to seek approval for off-label uses
because of time and expense of FDA procedures).
41. See Michael E. Petrella, Comment, License to Maim: FederalPre-emption and the
MedicalDeviceAmendments of1976, 6 HEALTHMATRIX 349, 368 n. 122 (1996) (defining off-label
uses as those the FDA has not approved as safe or effective).
42. See Christopher, supra note 36, at 248.
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difficulty exists because a deviant use43 can be accomplished independently
by the patient in the privacy of his or her own home, without the assistance
of medical practitioners or any other professionals.' Once a prescription
drug is in a patient's hands, the manner in which the drug is used also is in
the patient's hands. Perhaps due in part to these dynamics,45 off-label use
ofprescription drugs was not outlawed even prior to the legislation passed
in 1997, which liberalized the marketing of such use.'
2. Off-Label Prescription
Off-label prescription of drugs occurs when a doctor prescribes a drug

in any manner that varies from labeling specifications.47 A doctor who

prescribes a drug that has been approved by the FDA for purpose X, in
order to achieve the different purpose Y, is prescribing off-label.4" The
term also applies to prescription of a drug to groups other than those for
whom the FDA approved it,49 for periods of use exceeding the labeled

recommended use,5" or in combination with other FDA-approved drugs."'

Legislators and regulators could prohibit off-label prescription of drugs
at least somewhat more effectively than they could prohibit off-label use

43. "Deviant use" refers here to the deviation of a use from labeling specifications. The term
is not intended to be pejorative, or to impute culpability of any kind to the user.
44. Off-label use certainly could be prohibited, just as the use of illegal drugs such as
marijuana is prohibited. Given how difficult it is for law enforcement agencies to expunge the use
of contraband in the privacy of a user's home, imagine how difficult it would be for law enforcers
to expunge the unauthorized misuse of legally prescribed drugs in the privacy of a user's home. The
law certainly could be passed, but the implementation and enforcement of the law would be
virtually impossible.
45. See Lars Noah, Constraints on the Off-Label Uses of PrescriptionDrug Products, 16 J.
PROD. & Toxics LAB. 139, 139 (1994) (discussing pragmatic difficulties in controlling off-label
uses).

46. See FDA Modernization Act of 1997,21 U.S.C. § 301 (1997).
47. See Michael I. Krauss, Essay, Loosening the FDA's Drug Certification Monopoly:
Implications for Tort Law and Consumer Welfare, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 457, 470 (1996)
(referring to off-label prescription as physicians' prescribing drugs for uses other than FDA
approved uses).
48. See Timothy R. Franson, FDA Rules Can CostLives, USATODAY, Oct. 26,1995, at 12A
(discussing prescription of drugs approved for one disease in the treatment of a different disease).
49. Perhaps the most common off-label prescription occurs when drugs approved for
treatment of adults are prescribed to treat children. See Charles J. Cote et al., Is the "Therapeutic
Orphan"About to Be Adopted?, 98 PEDIATRICS 118, 122 (1996) (discussing this off-label use).
50. See, e.g., Jeff Nesmith, DrugRecall Puts Shadow on Approval Process,ATLANTA J. &
CONST., June 24, 1998, at A03 (discussing physician prescription of drug Duract, prior to its recall,
for periods exceeding the labeled 10-day limit).
51. See, e.g., John Accola, "Fen-Phen" Foes Fuming OverProposedFDA Review Change,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 30, 1997, at 413. The administration of fenfluramine in tandem with
phentermine, prior to the recall ofthe former, was a popular off-label prescription during the middle
years of this decade.
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of drugs. Doctors keep medical records that indicate diagnoses, and laws
could be passed to ensure that a prescribed drug has been approved for the
diagnosed condition. Of course, logistical problems, such as doctors'

circumventing the law by misrecording diagnoses in medical records,
could not be entirely eliminated. Presumably, however, risk of exposure
and punishment would be a reasonably strong deterrent to such
professional lapses. Accordingly, a ban on off-label prescriptions likely
would be more feasible than a ban on off-label use. Logic also tells us that
such a ban, although not a direct prohibition of off-label use, probably
would serve to reduce its incidence. 2
Nevertheless, off-label prescription was permissible before Congress's
1997 liberalizations.53 This fact is largely attributable to the scope of the
FDA's authority, which extends to manufacturers of drugs but not to the
physicians who dispense them. 4 Doctors long have been judicially
accorded broad and unconstrained prescribing authority.55 Numerous
decisions support this approach, which emphasizes physician autonomy
56
and discretion within an otherwise rigorous regulatory environment.
The latitude accorded the medical profession in regard to off-label
prescription is extensive. For example, doctors generally need not tell
patients that the drugs they are takirng have not been approved for the
prescribed use.57 Failure to inform patients that the treatment they are
receiving is an off-label application does not, in itself, constitute
malpractice. Of course, physicians can be held liable for negligence if
their off-label applications are iufficiently careless, imprudent, or

unprofessional.59 Conversely, they also face the risk of liability for failing

52. There are two reasons why prohibiting off-label prescriptions would likely reduce the
incidence of off-label use. First, patients would have greater trouble getting access to drugs that
doctors were not legally permitted to dispense for the patients' symptoms. Second, patients would
be less likely even to know of a potential off-label use if doctors were discouraged from off-label
prescribing. In many instances, the patient who uses a drug product off-label is directed to do so
by a doctor who has explained and encouraged the use.
53. See James L.J. Nuzzo, M.D., Independent Prescribing Authority of Advanced Practice
Nurses: A Threat to the Public Health?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 35, 45 (1998) (noting 1982 FDA
statement that off-label prescribing is an "accepted medical practice" that the agency condones).
54. See Althea Gregory, Denying Protection to Those Most in Need: The FDA's
Unconstitutional Treatment of Children, 8 ALB. L.J. Sci. &TEcH. 121 (1997).
55. See Drusilla S. Raiford et al., DeterminingAppropriate ReimbursementforPrescription
Drugs: Off-Label Uses and Investigational Therapies, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 37, 39 (1994).
56. See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc. v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 93 F.3d 511,
514 n.3 (8th Cir. 1996); Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 198 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Evers, 453 F. Supp. 1141, 1149-50 (M.D. Ala. 1978), afTd, 643 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1981).
57. See Joan R. Rose, Informed Consent: How Much Must Doctors Reveal?, MED. ECON.,
Apr. 29, 1996, at 25.
58. See id.
59. See AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS COMMITTEE ON DRUGS, Unapproved Uses of Approved

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol51/iss2/1

10

Salbu: Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs:
REGULATORYPOUICYONOFF-LABEL

USES OFDRUGS

to provide appropriate treatment simply because it is an off-label
application.' Regardless of whether a physician is deciding to prescribe or
withhold an off-label treatment, the failure to exercise reasonable care
opens channels of potential liability, just as it would in any other area of
medical practice."
3. Off-Label Promotion and Marketing
Finally, compare off-label use and prescription with off-label
promotion and marketing of drugs. The latter processes occur when the
manufacturers of the drugs promote or advertise their products for
purposes, to users, in dosages, or in combinations other than the FDAapproved ones.62 As this definition suggests, the term "off-label marketing"
applies only to activities of manufacturers. Accordingly, when physicians
write freely about off-label applications of prescription drugs, they are not
engaging in off-label marketing, and their activities never have been
proscribed.63 Conversely, if the manufacturer of these drugs reproduces or
distributes the doctor's writings to other physicians, its activities are
considered to fall in what historically has been the highly-controlled arena
of off-label marketing.'M
While direct and blatant advertising to physicians is easily identified as
off-label marketing, other practices fall in gray areas. For example, a 1997
FDA release suggested that manufacturers could be engaging in off-label
promotion when they provide grants supporting symposia on unapproved
uses of drugs,65 or grants to managed care organizations to encourage their
Drugs:The Physician,the PackageInsert,andthe Food andDrugAdministration:Subject Review,
98 PEDIATRICS 143, 144 (1996).
60. See id. ("Indeed, a physician could be subject to a claim of malpractice if he or she denied
a patient potentially the best treatment solely because the use was not included in the official
labeling of the drug.").
61. For discussion of the reasonable care test in malpractice cases, see Susan Cowan
Atkinson, Note, Medicare "Cost Containment" and Home Health Care:Potential Liabilityfor
Physiciansand Hospitals, 21 GA. L. REV. 901, 913-17 (1987).
62. A broad definition of off-label marketing and promotion would include these functions
directed at anyone, including both health care professionals and consumers. As explained in Section
III, the 1997 legislation that permits off-label advertising and promotion restricts these processes
to be directed to certain qualified professionals. See 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(a) (1997). Accordingly,
when I speak of authorized off-label marketing and promotion, I am restricting my reference to only
those professional groups to whom manufacturers can direct their promotional literature under the
statute.
63. See Richard A. Samp, FDA CensorshipThreatensPatientMedical Care,CONSUMERS'
RES. MAG., Dec. 1994, at 16.
64. See id.
65. See 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074 (1997). The test for whether such support is off-label marketing
has generally centered around the issue ofindependence: "Ifa scientific or educational program that
pertains to research concerning potential new uses of a medical product is intended to be and is
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off-label use or promotion of a product.'
As described in Part III, off-label marketing and promotion were not
permitted before 1997, but were authorized under limited conditions by the
Modernization Act, which was passed that year.67 The ban on off-label
promotion and marketing that existed before 1997 was easily implemented
because of two factors: ease of infraction identification and ease of
enforcement. 6
The observations in this and the preceding two subsections suggest that
off-label use, prescription, and marketing/promotion are processes that can
differ substantially in both their capacity to be monitored and controlled
and Congress's desire to monitor and control them. Accordingly, the three
classes of off-label activities will be discussed in this article using the
specific phrases of (a) "use," (b) "prescription," and (c) "marketing,"
"promotion," or "advertising," and it is important for the reader to
remember the significance of the distinctions. When all processes are to be
signified inclusively, the phrases "off-label activities," "off-label
applications," and "off-label functions" will be employed.
C. The Controversy Over Various Off-Label
Activities and Functions
We noted in Subpart II.B.1. that off-label use of drugs is virtually
impossible to control by law. Off-label prescription, however, could be
prohibited with some success, and off-label marketing and promotion are
highly susceptible to legislative and regulatory control. The debate over
off-label processes and functions has tended to focus mostly on the
marketing and promotional aspects that are conducive to legal monitoring.
This Subpart examines separately the arguments favoring and disfavoring
all off-label processes, with particular emphasis on marketing and
promotion functions.

truly independent of any direct or indirect influence by the sponsoring company," then sponsorship
has not been viewed by the FDA as off-label marketing. I. Scott Bass et al., Off-Label Promotion:
Is FDA's Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Programs
Enforceable?, 53 FOOD & DRUG LJ.193, 195 (1998). Conversely, when the sponsoring company

seeks to exert influence, it is not considered to be acting independently, and the FDA has viewed
its activities as a form of off-label marketing. See id.
66. See Paul E. Kalb & I. Scott Bass, Government Investigations in the Pharmaceutical
Industry: Off-label Promotion,FraudandAbuse, and FalseClaims,53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 63,67
(1998) (referring to 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074 (Dec. 3, 1997)).
67. See infraPart III.
68. Because marketing efforts usually are visible, they usually are also easy to detect.
Companies obviously know this and are reluctant to commit blatant, highly observable violations
within the tightly controlled and heavily monitored regulatory environment of the drug industry.
These dynamics combine to make a ban on off-label marketing not only easy to implement, but to
a large extent, self-enforcing.
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1. Arguments Favoring Off-Label Processes
Proponents of off-label processes focus predominantly on their
potential to expedite the development and availability of effective new
treatments. As already noted, physicians traditionally have been permitted
to prescribe drugs at their discretion for off-label uses.69 Subpart I.C. .a.
notes the prevalence of off-label practices in medicine today, and the
contention of proponents that these practices contribute immeasurably to
the quality of medical care. Subpart H.C.l.b. examines the theoretical
foundations for some of the observations in Subpart .C. .a., explaining
why off-label activities logically should improve the practice of medicine.
a. Contentions that Off-Label Practices Are
Both Prevalent and Necessary
Off-label practices are both widespread and beneficial to today's
medical practice. Professor Beales contends that off-label uses are
frequently "an important part of medical therapy."70 Page notes that "a
significant portion of drug use" today is off-label drug use.71 One estimate
suggests that between twenty and sixty percent of all prescriptions are for
off-label uses.72 Pediatric prescriptions are especially likely to be off-label
because many drugs are not tested for use by children.73
Other specific examples abound. A report in the Journalof the National
CancerInstitutestates that off-label use of cancer drugs is prevalent.74 Offlabel applications not only are common in cancer therapy; they also are
considered to be among the most effective treatments. Off-label
applications in oncology have been called "the hallmark of state-of-the-art
treatment."7' Accordingly, proponents often cite the high incidence and
effectiveness of off-label cancer drugs to support their position.76

69. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
70. J. Howard Beales, 1I, Economic Analysis and the Regulation of Pharmaceutical
Advertising, 24 SETON HALLL. REv. 1370, 1385 (1994).
71. Martin Page, CBER Status On Reform Initiatives:Industry Reactions andComments, 52
FOOD& DRUG LJ. 193, 195 (1997).
72. See Krauss, supra note 47, at 472.
73. See Lisa Schiff, MSA, AWP andPartnerSkirmishes, BUS.& HEALTH, Sept. 1997, at 89.
74. See Kate Nagy, StatesAim Lawsat Off-LabelReimbursement, 85 J.NAT'LCANCER INST.
701,701 (1993).
75. Gail Dutton, Should You Let the FDA Decide What Drugs You Pay For?, BUS. &
HEALTH, Oct. 1996, at 65.
76. See James G. Dickinson, FDA Reform Effort Becomes a Dance of Strategy and Tactic,
MED.MKrG. &MEDIA, May 1996, at 12 (callingfrequentlyprescribed off-label cancerdrugs "akey
example used by the [FDA's] ...critics when pushing for reforms in the area of unapproved uses
promotion").
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Off-label prescriptions likewise dominate a number of other areas of
medical practice. For example, the great majority of drugs prescribed for
the healing ofwounds are approved and labeled only for other conditions.'
Yet perhaps nowhere else has the impact of off-label use been as dramatic
as in the treatment of AIDS. Experts suggest that between ninety and one
hundred percent of applications, including all of the revolutionary
antiretroviral combination therapies,78 are off-label.79
Attorneys Beck and Azari summarize the situation, describing off-label
activity as widespread and suggesting it is an essential component of
optimal patient care. ° Indeed, the only factors constraining physicians' offlabel prescriptions are potential tort liability" and gradually dwindling
vestiges of insurance company and health plan policies 2 that deny
coverage of off-label applications, 3 where such policies are still legal."
If off-label use of drugs can help patients, then off-label marketing may
enable the greatest number of potential beneficiaries to receive the
treatments best suited to their needs.' The example most frequently cited
77. See Martin Wright, Prescribing"Off-Label" Drugsfor Wound Healing Is Common,
DERMATOLOGY TIMES, July 1996, at 35.
78. See Ram6n A. Torres & Michael Barr, Impact of CombinationTherapyforHIVInfection
on Inpatient Census, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1531, 1532 (1997). These therapies, first introduced
into medical practice in 1995, combine two nucleoside analogues with a protease inhibitor. See id.
The therapies have been widely hailed as a major breakthrough in HIV and AIDS treatment,
resulting in substantial reduction in disease progression and mortality. See, e.g., Robert Steinbrook,
Battling HIV on Many Fronts,337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 779 (1997) (observing substantial decline
in AIDS deaths immediately following the initiation of antiretroviral combination therapies).
79. See Kenneth P. Berkowitz et al., CongressTries to Bridge the "LabelGap," But Nobody
Is Cheering,MED. MKrG. &MEDIA, Jan. 1998 (citing panel comments of Steven K. Carter that 90%
of AIDS drug use is off-label, as the drugs are approved for single-agent uses at end stages of the
disease but often used in combination during earlier stages of the disease; and comments of Mark
Smith that off-label use of AIDS treatments is "pretty much 100 percent").
80. See James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent:
Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 71 (1998).
81. See, e.g., Paul v. Bochenstein, 482 N.Y.S.2d 870,871 (App. Div. 1984) (holding doctor
liable for malpractice for administering dosages exceeding manufacturer recommendations).
82. See Michael F. Conlan, Unapproved Uses Prove Worrisome, DRUG ToPics, Oct. 21,
1996, att6O (observing that "denial ofreimbursementfor off-label drugs ha[s] declined significantly
as a problem in the past few years," and observing changes in Medicare policy that increase
reimbursement of off-label treatments for cancer patients). For discussion of these policies and
some of the reasons the insurance industry gives for the policies, see Bill Gradison, Don't Rush to
Mandate Unproven Therapy Coverage, BEST'S REV., Nov. 1996, at 80.
83. See Allison Bell, Massachusetts Adopts List of Off-Label HIV Treatments, NAT'L
UNDERWRrrER, Apr. 29, 1996, at 49 ("Some health plans refuse to reimburse patients for drugs
prescribed for off-label uses.").
84. See Harris Fleming Jr., Going Off-Label, DRUG TopiCs, Apr. 6, 1998, at 57 (discussing
laws being passed in numerous states that require insurance companies to cover off-label
prescriptions under a variety of conditions).
85. The reasoning behind this proposition is as follows: the historic legalization of both off-
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to support this assertion concerns the off-label use of aspirin to reduce the
risk of a heart attack. Credible sources have suggested since the 1980s that
tens of thousands of heart attacks would have been averted had it been
lawful to advertise the benefits of aspirin for this purpose.' Thus while
legalized off-label use and prescription are a good start, they simply are not
enough. Unless promotion is also permitted, valuable and potentially lifesaving off-label uses will remain isolated and limited.
Restricting off-label marketing can contribute to sub-optimal patient
treatment in another way-by cutting off a valuable potential source of
cost-containment. Subjecting all uses of a drug to FDA approval
procedures increases the number of clinical trials, thereby also raising
manufacturer research and development expenditures." At least some of
these costs will become social costs, 9 as they are passed to consumers in
the form of price increases in an environment in which pharmaceutical
pricing is already a serious concem.Y°
Another aspect of cost-containment concerns the resources saved or put
to better use by the FDA when off-label applications can be marketed
without seeking FDA approval. In 1995, House Commerce Committee
counsel Alan Slobodin suggested that the FDA expends resources
unnecessarily on relatively unimportant side-issues such as the monitoring
of off-label uses.91 Were the FDA to focus on what Slobodin considers its
"core mission ' ' 92 - the expedient assessment of new drugs and devices-at
least two potential efficiencies might be achieved. Tax dollars spent by the
FDA could be reduced, and performance in the core areas could be

label use and off-label prescription has helped innumerable patients who otherwise would have
been denied effective treatment. It is possible, however, that the traditional prohibition of off-label
advertising and promotion have thwarted the access of others who may have benefitted from an offlabel use, had they only been aware of it.
86. See, e.g., Krauss, supra note 47.
87. See id.at 471.
88. See Beck & Azari, supra note 80,at 77.
89. Of course, casting this expenditure as a social cost rather than a social benefit presumes
that the resources devoted to the supposedly extraneous research are indeed wasted. If clinical tests
of off-label uses were to expose enough risks and dangers of sufficient magnitude, the expense of
the tests could be outweighed by the protective functions that they would serve.
90. Earlier this decade, some pharmaceutical companies agreed to curb the rising costs of
prescription drugs. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum &Michael Waldholz, HarshMedicine:AttackonDrug
PricesOpens Clinton'sFightforHealth-CarePlan,WALLST. J, Feb. 16,1993, at Al, A6 (noting
recommendation of chairman of Merck that drug companies voluntarily limit price increases to
inflation rate). Notwithstanding this commitment, prices forsome drugs are skyrocketing today. See
ElyseTanouye, Drugs:Behindthe Inflation in Prescription-DrugPrices,WALLST. J., July 6,1998,
at A17.
91. See Jill Wechsler, Better With FTC?,PHARM. EXEC., Nov. 1995, at 16.
92. Id.
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hastened and improved, benefitting consumers and manufacturers alike. 93
The savings could expedite patient access to valuable treatments by
permitting the FDA to process new drug applications more quickly using
the money it conserves, and by contributing to a reduced public tax burden
that would free consumer dollars for spending on pharmaceutical
treatments.
b. Theoretical Foundations for the Argument that Off-Label
Activities Improve the Practice of Medicine
The preceding Subpart observed that off-label prescription is very
common and that proponents suggest that it improves the quality of health
care. This Subpart examines the reasoning behind this position. The logic
is based on two key realities of the medical and scientific communities: (i)
the role of practitioners in the advancement of treatments, and (ii) the need
to expedite the distribution of sound scientific information, even if it has
not passed through the lengthy rigors of FDA review procedures. Subpart
H.C. 1.b.ii. incorporates discussion of constitutional speech issues as they
relate to the expedient distribution of scientific findings.
i. The Role of Practitioners in the Advancement of Treatments
Consider that engagement in research is rare in comparison to the
practice of medicine. There are simply far fewer research laboratories than
there are medical clinics and offices. 9 Moreover, the laboratories that do
exist, if they are run according to sound scientific principles, employ
meticulous and therefore time-consuming methodologies. 95 When scarcity
of research facilities is combined with exacting and laborious methods, the
development of findings will be slow.
In contrast, the larger corps of physicians who practice on a daily basis

93. Because the Modernization Act's liberalization of off-label marketing requires
manufacturers to submit supplemental applications for off-label uses, the reforms that were adopted
do not achieve the potential efficiencies that might have been obtained had no such requirement
been included in the legislation. For discussion of the supplemental application requirement, see
infra Subpart III.C.
94. The dynamics underlying this reality are as follows. Medical practitioners routinely set
up individual and small-group practices that are financially feasible because of the direct support
they receive through immediate collection of patient fees or imminent collection of insurance and
Medicare reimbursement. Setting up research endeavors is more complicated and precarious,
requiring establishment of expensive laboratories that are not funded by patient fees, but through
government, corporate, or university funding. Because all of these sources of financing are scarce
and subject to many conflicting claims, research laboratories will always be far fewer than medical
care facilities.
95. See Braun v. Lorillard, Inc., 84 F.3d 230,235 (7th Cir. 1996) (referring to "the scientist's
creed of meticulous and objective inquiry").
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may be compelled by economic forces to see many patients over the course
of a year.' Although their contact with patients' problems and their
treatment is far more informal than a scientist's contact, physicians
nonetheless encounter many of the same challenges that researchers face.
Through the processes of diagnosis, treatment, prescription, and posttreatment observation, doctors naturally will notice trends and develop
theories of cause-and-effect that will be informally tested as their practices
progress. Large numbers of doctors who share information through
professional contact can exploit each others' informal findings, thereby
becoming a likely source of some innovative drug applications.'
Physicians informally practicing as sole practitioners or in small groups
have another advantage over formalized laboratory structures in the
development of new theories-they are less likely to be subjected to
bureaucratic constraints and institutional pressures in regard to their
findings. To some extent or another, the formal research that occurs in
laboratories is subjected to organizational forces.98 Unfortunately, a
dysfunctional relationship exists between innovation and centralized
authority, which tends to constrain innovation." Doctors typically have
wide berth in interpreting observations. Despite the heralded objectivity of
the scientific method,"° scientists can be stifled and confined by the
incentives and expectations established by the research institutions they
serve. 10' As a result, the open-mindedness we expect from the scientific
community might be more prevalent among observant medical
96. Indeed, many doctors see a large number of patients every day. See Andy Miller, When
You Grow Up to Be a Doctor,ATL J. & CONST., Apr. 4, 1994, at E3.
97. The developing liberalization of pharmaceutical law has included a recognition of the
value of physicians' observations in advancing the state of medical knowledge. For example, the
regulations that authorize physician-led parallel track treatment using experimental drugs require
physician reporting of safety and efficacy information to drug sponsors. See 57 Fed. Reg. 13,258
(1992). This requirement suggests that regulators recognize the value of physicians' informal
observations and learning during the course of treatment.
98. University labs that are typically funded through grants face pressure to mold both
projects and findings in ways that increase the likelihood that grants will be extended, thereby
ensuring the labs' continued survival. Private corporate labs are subject to the pressures of financial
analyses that suggest certain facilities are superfluous or irrelevant to the corporate mission.
Researchers working for pharmaceutical companies also may be directed in terms of the kind of
research they are expected to do, and may be affected by knowledge of the kinds of results that
would be considered most desirable and therefore be most highly rewarded.
99. See Steven R. Salbu, Should AIDS Research Be Regulated? A Manhattan Projectfor
AIDS and OtherPolicy Proposals,69 IND. L.L 425,440 (1994).
100. See Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1,73 (1994) (referring to "the
'scientific methodi]' ... , in which '[tihe objective data determine what is to be accepted as
scientific truth"') (citation omitted).
101. Among other things, institutions can shape the research questions that get asked; the
methodology ultimately adopted, including its particular flaws and biases; and the desirability of
any one direction of findings over other directions of findings.
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practitioners.
In this vein, a General Accounting Office report states that the FDA
"could not review drugs in its lengthy testing process at a pace equal to that
at which physicians discover beneficial off-label uses."'" The result is that,
while the FDA has tended to view labels as Bibles, medical practice
frequently improves on approved indications and dosages, such that
doctors103who adhere strictly to labeled information are "behind the
wave.1

ii. The Need to Expedite the Distribution of Sound Scientific
Information, Even if It Has Not Passed Through the
Lengthy Rigors of FDA Review Procedures
Despite the expense and scarcity of scientific laboratories in
comparison to the more informal learning environments of medical
practices, formal high-quality research is conducted today in many
different settings. Pharmaceutical research is executed in private corporate
laboratories, as well as at universities and not-for-profit research centers
throughout the country and around the world." Ordinarily, without
government intervention, we would expect knowledge to be collected and
shared by the scientific community, and to pass quickly to and throughout
the medical community. FDA regulation of off-label promotion dampens
this expectation.'05
Off-label prescription relies on the expedient and unfettered diffusion
of the wealth of information amassed in laboratories. Years before any
FDA approval procedures could be navigated from start to finish,
physicians read articles published by highly regarded scientists and
medical researchers in peer-reviewed joumals.1 6 The optimally-informed

102. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMM. ON LABOR AND
HUMAN RESOURCES, U.S. SENATE, OFF-LABEL DRUGS: REIMBURSEMENT POUCIES CONSTRAIN
PHYSICIANS IN THEIR CHOICE OF CANCER THERAPIES (1991).
103. William G. Castagnoli,NewPlayersRecastthe PPIDebate,MED. MKTG. &MEDIA, May

1996, at 44.
104. See Steven R. Salbu, AIDS and Drug Pricing:In Search of a Policy, 71 WASH. U. L.Q.

691,722-24 (1993) (discussing various public and private forums in which government-sponsored
pharmaceutical research is done).
105. See Off-Label Info Okay: So What?, IN VIVO, Dec. 1997, at 2 [hereinafter So What?]
("Industry and patient groups have long pointed out that [prohibiting off-label marketing]...
prevents credible information from reaching physicians so they can treat patients according to the
latest medical knowledge.").
106. While the peer-review process is imperfect, it also is a rigorous system under which
research frequently undergoes several iterations of revision and resubmission. Although any review
system that employs human assessors inevitably will have flaws, the use of scientists to evaluate
blindly the work of their peers is probably the right conceptual start. For discussion of the peer
review process and its strengths and weaknesses, see Lars Noah, SanctifyingScientificPeerReview:
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physician is introduced to the most current scientifically valid
information" 7 and incorporates it into his or her practice." 8 Arguably, the
result is medical care that more closely approximates the scientific state of
the art.' °9

A crucial factor in this process is the necessity of keeping doctors
informed about the latest relevant research findings. Who is to accomplish
this task? Manufacturers have the greatest incentive, as well as the
resources, to spread the news of research findings that support new and
beneficial off-label uses of their products. Liberalized off-label promotion
therefore should yield the most progressive medical practicd. As
Polubinski notes, patients under such a system "may receive better,
potentially life-saving treatments before the completion of the lengthy
approval process."11
These and related arguments can be cast in terms of the value, and
indeed the sanctity, of free speech, to be impeded only under compelling
conditions. 1 ' Indeed, pharmaceutical manufacturers cast the issue of offlabel marketing in terms of whether they should be denied the freedom to
provide doctors with "truthful information."' 2 The speech angle can be
couched broadly in the context of the dialogue that exists among scientists,
medical practitioners, and allied health professionals, and how crucial it is
that "the flow of scientific information about off-label uses.., not be
unduly inhibited."' 3 A reasonable argument can be made that, particularly
Publicationas a ProxyforRegulatoryDecisionmaking,59 U. PrT.L. REV. 677, 693-711 (1998).
107. See Off-Label Use of Drugs an Issue: FDA and PharmaceuticalResearch and
Manufacturersof America Deal with Off-Label Drug Regulations, CHAIN DRUG REv., Jan. 20,

1997, at RX6 (quoting PhRMA spokesperson Jeff Trewhitt, "Doctors should be allowed to have
information about [off-label] ...
procedures as long as the information is valid and is documented
scientifically.").
108. See Charles J. Walsh & AllisaPyrich, RationalizingtheRegulationofPrescriptionDrugs
andMedicalDevices:Perspectiveson PrivateCertificationand Tort Reform, 48 RuTGERSL. REv.

883,913 n. 123 (1996) ("With increasing frequency, physicians are prescribing off-label uses based
on recent research or experiments, prior to the new use being approved by the FDA.").
109. Recall from the preceding Subpart that alarge army ofdoctors can make valuable medical
discoveries in the course of their own practices. This process is furthered when doctors are given
open access to credible scientific and medical knowledge as soon as it is published, without need
to wait for bureaucratic approval. Doctors can use this information to develop the logical,
scientifically supported, creative off-label treatments that arise in the course of medical practice.
110. Polubinski, supra note 33, at 1005.
111. See FDA Charged with Rights Violation, Bus. & HEALTH, Feb. 1996, at 9 (noting
concerns of civil libertarians that off-label advertising restrictions violate the speech rights of both
providers and recipients).
112. Jill Wechsler, Back to the Future? The Rise and Fallof Reform, PHARM. EXEC., Dec.

1996, at 58 (noting, prior to the passage of the Modernization Act, that "[a] key goal for
pharmaceutical marketers was to gain more leeway in providing doctors with 'truthful
information"').
113. Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, FDA Efforts to Control the Flow of Information at
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in regard to advertisements aimed at professionals, the marketplace of
conflicting ideas is the most appropriate protection against incomplete,
inaccurate, or otherwise misleading data.114 This approach "comports with
the Supreme Court's preference for combating potentially problematic
speech with more speech." '
Richard A. S amp, Chief Counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation,
notes that, "in its zeal to protect the American public, the FDA apparently
has overlooked the very real First Amendment concerns created by its
' He further charges that "[b]y attempting to suppress truthful
policies."116
information about FDA-approved drugs and devices, the agency appears
to be infringing on the constitutional rights of speakers to convey such

information and of listeners (most of them medical professionals) to
' The result is that doctors and other health
receive such information."117
care practitioners and 18professionals may be suboptimally, or even
inadequately, informed.'
Finally, any approach more restrictive than broadly permissible offlabel marketing can thwart vigorous discussion and debate. The result
could be to retard the development of optimal patient treatment regimes.
U.S. District Court Judge Royce C. Lamberth recently supported this

perspective, ruling in July of 1998 that off-label promotions constitute
protected commercial speech that cannot be unduly restricted by
government regulation.11 9
These potential social benefits of off-label practices are indeed
compelling, but as noted in the folcwing Subpart, they are eroded to some
degree by a number of costs, particularly risks to the public that are

Pharmaceutical Industry-Sponsored Medical Education Programs: A Regulatory Overdose, 24
SETON HAL L. REv. 1325, 1354 n.158 (1994) (referring to comments in speech by Michael R.
Taylor) (citation omitted).
114. Reliance on the marketplace of ideas for consumer protection appears stronger in cases
like this than it may appear in other cases. I refer here to the fact that the marketplace of ideas upon
which we would rely in this instance would be used by health care practitioners and other
professionals. Logically, we can expect the marketplace of ideas to protect against the effects of bad
information most effectively among well-educated participants who have access to many
information sources. The practitioners and professionals at issue are likely to fall in this category.
115. Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 73 (D.D.C. 1998).
116. Richard A. Samp, FDA Faces Court-Ordered Limits to Its Powers, MED. MKTG. &
MEDIA, Sept. 1997, at 50.
117. Id
118. See Michael F. Conlan, Not Good Enough: Some Feel FDA's Easingof Off-Label Rules
Still Falls Short, DRUGTOpICS, Jan. 22, 1996, at 68 (discussing contention of Jeff Trewitt that preModernization Act FDA off-label marketing reforms were inadequate to keep health care
practitioners sufficiently well-informed).
119. See Washington Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 74. For discussion, see Rochelle Sharp,
Some Restrictions on Drug Makers'Ability to Promote Off-Label Uses Are Overruled, WALL ST.
J., July 31, 1998, at A12.
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associated with untested and unapproved applications. 2 ' To make their
strongest arguments infavor of off-label applications, proponents need to
address this potentially substantial downside. One possible way to do this
is through the age-old compromise of substituting paternalistic protection
with information.12 1 If the potential benefits of off-label use outweigh the
potential costs, and the public risks are clearly disclosed, one can argue
that reduced regulation increases social utility. While disclosure efforts of
the past have tended to focus on manufacturer disclosures,' which
directly reach physicians rather than the public, disclosure in this instance
would likely include statements by doctors to patients warning them that
off-label applications have not been subjected to FDA scrutiny."
2. Arguments Disfavoring Off-Label Processes
Opponents of off-label processes converge, albeit from a variety of
starting points, upon a single basic objection-that the lack of regulatory
control over off-label applications endangers human health and human life.
Subpart II.C.2.a. explains this basic premise and provides an example of
the potential pitfalls of liberal off-label policies; the Subparts after that
concern some of the particular problems that critics associate with the
absence of FDA oversight. Subpart ll.C.2.b. examines the contention that
off-label applications are the equivalent of experimental treatments and
should be treated as such. Subpart ll.C.2.c. looks at an argument that has
been lodged specifically at legalized off-label marketing-the contention
that permitting off-label promotions of drugs will discourage
manufacturers from investigating the effectiveness and safety of off-label
uses. Subpart Il.C.2.d. describes the pressures and conflicts of interest that
can contaminate the content of off-label promotions. Subpart ll.C.2.e.
discusses responses to the free speech arguments of off-label marketing
proponents.

120. See infra notes 124-48 and accompanying text.
121. See John M. Blim, Comment, Free Speech and Health Claims Under the Nutrition
Labeling and Education Act of 1990: Applying a Rehabilitated Central Hudson Test for
Commercial Speech, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 733, 755 (1994) (noting argument that access to all
information and freedom of individuals to make their own judgment using that information are
superior to paternalistic protections).
122. See, e.g., Richard Haugh, Label Fable?,HOSPrrAL&HEALTHNETWORKS, Feb. 20,1998,

at 82 (discussing bill to require medical device manufacturers "to include a warning that off-label
uses weren't necessarily safe or effective and could even be harmful').
123. Presently, physicians are not required by law to inform patients that a treatment they are
receiving involves an off-label use of a drug. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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a. The General Argument that Lack of Regulatory
Control Over Off-Label Applications Endangers
Human Health and Human Life
Let's admit for the moment that supporters are correct in asserting that
off-label practices expedite the discovery and the diffusion of some
effective patient treatments. Critics would remind us that these benefits
come at a price. Even if off-label uses are as prevalent in today's practice
of medicine as proponents suggest, such entrenchment could be a bad thing
as easily as a good thing.124 This would be true, for example, if many of the
common off-label uses were to prove ineffectual, harmful, or both.
Is this scenario plausible? Napoli notes that while some off-label drug
uses are relatively harmless, others are "costly, threatening, and highly
toxic."'" This should not be surprising, given that both the off-label
prescription and the off-label use of a drug lack the FDA imprimatur, and
therefore also lack the consumer safeguarding we usually associate with
prescription drugs.12 6 The law requires that manufacturers submit
rigorously developed evidence of safety and efficacy to receive approval
to market a drug for purposes noted in the labeling.127 No such requirement
is imposed in regard to subsequent, off-label uses. Accordingly,
information regarding proper dosage, as well as drug safety and efficacy
for the off-label application, need not be collected or recorded.1 2' These
dynamics have led to concerns "that physicians and consumers will be
misled into relying on scientific logic or scanty data supporting a particular
use, without adequate' 129
well-controlled clinical trials that prove definitively
that the drug works.
Consider an example.1 30 Public Citizen has highlighted the fen-phen
experience as "a textbook study of why.., off-label promotions... are so

124. See Sean Turner et al., Unlicensed and Off Label Drug Use in Paediatric Wards:
ProspectiveStudy, BRrr. MED. J. 343, 344 (1998) (stating that while off-label uses of drugs to treat
children are widespread, it is unclear whether such uses are appropriate).
125. Chemotherapyand Informed Consent, HEALTHFACrS, Sept. 1997, at 1, 5.
126. For this reason, before the FDA was required under the Modernization Act to allow
certain off-label promotion practices, it insisted that off-label marketing would "undermine the
integrity of the entire drug approval process." Zeroing in on Advertising and Promotion, PHARM.
EXEC., Nov. 1996, at 20.
127. See 21 C.F.R. § 312 (1998).
128. See Nancy A. Wynstra, Breast Cancer: Selected Legal Issues, 74 CANCER 491, 505
(1994).
129. Nancy K. Plant, PrescriptionDrug Promotionon the Internet:Tool for the Inquisitive
or Trapfor the Unwary?, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.89, 129 (1998).
130. While the forthcoming example has been the most salient one put forth in very recent
years, earlier criticism of off-label practices has focused on other drugs and products, such as RetinA, silicone, and collagen injections. See Michael Unger, More Bite Urgedfor Watchdog FDA,
NEWSDAY, Nov. 24, 1992, at 29.
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dangerous.' ' 1 The group notes that the FDA-approved drug fenfluramine,
the "fen" portion of fen-phen, was "widely used off-label in three ways" 3 '
prior to the FDA's determination that the drug presented "an unacceptable
risk.' 3 3 These common off-label uses included use in combination with
phentermine (the "phen" portion of fen-phen), the extended use of
fenfluramine beyond the brief approved periods, and the use of
fenfluramine by persons overweight but not obese. 3 Public Citizen further
cites the FDA's conservative estimate that 285,000 fen-phen users suffered
damage to heart valves during the brief period in which the combination
was widely prescribed. 135 It suggests that this tragedy resulted from an
eighty-fold increase in fenfluramine prescriptions following the release of
a 1992 study, which confirmed long-term weight-loss efficacy via the offlabel combination of fenfluramine with phentermine.' 36 Indeed, by 1996,
37
doctors wrote 18 million prescriptions for these two drugs.1
This enormous increase in fenfluramine prescriptions predated the
legalization of off-label marketing. 3 1 In other words, doctors began
prescribing fenfluramine in tandem with phentermine not because
manufacturers pressured them with an advertising blitz, but simply because
the doctors read the primary scientific evidence, or read about the scientific
evidence in secondary sources, or heard about the scientific evidence by
word of mouth.
This suggests two possible conclusions: (1) the legalization of off-label
prescription and use is enough, in itself and without the legalization of offlabel marketing, to promote devastating injury to the public health; and (2)
legalized off-label marketing logically would have exacerbated the
damage. Had the manufacturer of fenfluramine been permitted to market
the drug in off-label combination with phentermine and to a wide array of
patients,
many more people might have used and been injured by the
139
drug.

131. Public Citizen, Fen-Phen Fact Sheet, (visited
Feb. 3,
1998)
<http://www.citizen.org/publiccitizenlcongress/fda/S.%20830-FDA/fenfacts.htm>
[hereinafter
FactSheet].
132. Id.
133. FDA Announces Withdrawalof Fenfluramineand Dexfenfluramine, HHS NEWS, Sept.
15, 1997, at 97-32.
134. See Fact Sheet, supra note 131.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See Ronald M. Schwartz, FDA Warningon Rx Diet Combo, AM. DRUGGIST, Aug. 1997,
at 22.
138. The 1992 study preceded by five years the Modernization Act, which in 1997 legalized
qualified off-label marketing of prescription drugs. See infra Part III.
139. An alternative and obverse argument can be made here, however. Perhaps the history of
fen-phen and the proliferation of fenfluramine prescriptions in its wake highlight the pervasiveness
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b. The Contention that Off-Label Applications Are the Equivalent of
Experimental Treatments and Should Be Treated as Such
Critics have argued that legalized off-label applications subject the
public to treatment with what are closely analogous to, or even identical to,
experimental drugs. The vernacular of "experimenting on the public" thus
has made its way into the off-label debate. For example, a spokesperson for
Public Citizen suggests that off-label marketing permits drug consumers
to "become part of an uncontrolled experiment where no one is keeping
track of... who's helped and who's hurt."'" This critical perspective has
been echoed by a highly regarded medical school faculty member. 4 '
Likewise, some insurers 142 and IIMOs 143 classify off-label use as
experimental and therefore non-reimbursable.
The experimental drug analogy is predicated on a characteristic shared
by new drugs that have never undergone FDA review and off-label uses of
FDA approved drugs-in each instance, the use at issue has never
undergone scrutiny by the agency. Recall that a basic function of the FDA
is the protection of patients from dangerous drugs.'" From the perspective
of patients' safety concerns, off-label use of approved drugs is arguably
indistinguishable from use of entirely unapproved drugs. Given that neither
one has passed regulatory muster, how can the two be differentiated?
Permitting unapproved uses and prescriptions, not to mention their
marketing, may be inconsistent with the regulatory structure that governs

of information and its accessibility to doctors in an information era, regardless of and apart from
any manufacturer marketing efforts. Under this theory, off-label promotion by the manufacturer
would not have exacerbated this fiasco, because virtually all doctors would have read about offlabel use in the original articles or in news articles covering the findings, or else would have heard
of the off-label use through informal conversations with associates.
140. FDA to Ease "Off-Label" Use Restrictions,HEALTH LINE, June 8, 1998, availablein
LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
141. See Deborah Gesensway, Coming Soon: Off LabelMarketing; Changesat FDA Mean
FasterNew Drug Approvals-andMore Promotion, AM. C. OF PHYSICIANS OBSERVER ONLINE,
(visited July26,1998) <http:lwww.acponlin.orgljournalslnewsldec97/offlabel.htm> (quoting Paul
D. Stolley, University of Maryland School of Medicine chair of epidemiology and preventive
medicine, "mhis is a very uncontrolled part of medical practice. Doctors are doing uncontrolled
experimentation in their own practices, and the American people are being experimented on
because the drugs aren't being tested adequately.").
142. See Melody L. Harness, Note, What is "Experimental" Medical Treatment?: A
Legislative Definition Is Needed, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 67, 72 (1996).
143. See Kent G. Rutter, Note, DemocratizingHMO Regulation to Enforce the "Rule of
Rescue," 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 147, 185 (1996).
144. See Myron L. Marlin, Comment, TreatmentINDs: A Faster Route to Drug Approval?,
39 AM. U. L. REV. 171, 189 n.172 (1989) ("[D]etermination of actual safety and effectiveness of
particular drugs is one of [the] essential functions of FDA. ... " (citing Lemmon Pharmacal Co. v.
Richardson, 319 F. Supp. 375, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1970))).
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pharmaceutical access.
Wilsker has taken this critical perspective regarding off-label practices
to its logical conclusion, suggesting that an off-label combination of two
FDA-approved drugs should be treated as a new drug"a5 subject to the
FDA's ordinary new drug application processes." 4 He observes that two
drugs that are harmless taken individually can become deadly in
combination. 47 If the safety of the individual drugs may have no bearing
on the safety of the combination, the FDA can carry out its mission-the
monitoring of pharmaceuticals to provide reasonable assurance of public
safety--only by examining the combination as a separate and distinct
entity, with every bit as much rigor as it would apply to an ordinary new
drug application.'48
c. The Contention that Permitting Off-Label Promotions of Drugs Will
Discourage Manufacturers from Investigating the
Effectiveness and Safety of Off-Label Uses
The preceding Subparts have addressed criticism lodged very broadly
against all off-label practices, including off-label use, prescription, and
marketing of drugs. Yet despite these concerns, off-label use and
prescription
of FDA-approved drugs are widespread practices accepted
49
today.
Off-label marketing and promotion have been more controversial. 50
Prior to the passing of the Modernization Act, the FDA consistently
rejected the off-label marketing of drugs under the theory that it would
eliminate company incentives to engage in post-approval research
regarding new, unlabeled applications. ! If a manufacturer can market its
drugs for any and all uses once the drugs have been approved for one
treatment, why should it spend time and money to study the safety and
effectiveness of off-label applications? 152 The FDA was concerned that

145. See Jaime A. Wilsker, Note and Comment, One-Half Phen in the Morning/One Fen
Before Dinner:A ProposalforFDA Regulation of Off-Label Uses of Drugs, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 795,
844(1998).
146. See id. at 846.
147. See id at 845.
148. See id at 848-49.
149. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
150. See Alicia Ault, FurtherControversialProvisionin the Bill, 350 LANCEr 1690 (1997)
(referring to off-label promotion as one of "the most controversial elements" of the reform bill
leading to the Modernization Act).
151. See Alicia Ault Barnett, FDA ProposesEasing of Promotion Rules, 347 LANC=r 52
(1996); Wayne L. Pines, New Challengesfor Medical ProductPromotionand Its Regulation, 52
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 61, 64 (1997).

152. One possible answer is that, before the Modernization Act, manufacturers would study
safety and effectiveness of off-label uses in order to manage product liability risks. Under this
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manufacturers would get approval for a "cheap, narrow indication and the
next day begin selling the drug for multiple, broad, and profitable other
indications."153 In short, off-label marketing seemed to enable drug makers
to circumvent existing regulatory protections.
d. Identification of Pressures and Conflicts of Interest that Can
Contaminate the Content of Off-Label Promotions
The problems identified so far may be exacerbated by widespread
conflicts of interest; indeed, three important groups-manufacturers,
physicians, and scientists-all face either conflicts of interest or incentives
that encourage potentially risky off-label practices. The potential conflicts
of each group are discussed in the Subparts below.
i. Manufacturers' Conflicts
The pressures placed on pharmaceutical companies through the profit
motive is an implicit factor behind regulation of the pharmaceutical
industry. If drug companies were in the business of protecting the public
from potentially harmful products, they could and would spend their vast
resources hiring personnel to achieve this end, perhaps more effectively
than the FDA does. Drug companies, however, are in the business of
selling pharmaceutical products for a profit, and the pressures to do this
effectively can tempt companies to take imprudent risks with public health.
Of course, potential liability certainly should act at least to discourage
the precipitate introduction of unproven drugs and marketing of off-label
uses. Nonetheless, the need to meet quarterly earnings expectations can be
15 4
a powerful incentive to introduce promising new products prematurely.
The imposition of the FDA between the manufacturer and the market is
intended in large part to protect the public against this kind of dynamic. If
companies would be tempted to release dangerous products prematurely
without the existence of the FDA-approval buffer, why would they not be
tempted to market dangerous off-label uses if permitted to do so freely?
Moreover, the temptation to engage in inadvisable marketing practices
is not limited to struggling companies lacking successful products.
theory, a manufacturer would be foolish, and indeed potentially negligent, to market off-label uses
without data supporting the safety and effectiveness of those uses. In any event, the legislation that
authorized off-label marketing in 1997 resolved this issue by requiring manufacturers, subject to
certain possible exemptions, to submit supplemental applications in order to disseminate off-label
information. See 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-3 (1997).
153. James G. Dickinson, FDA Letter, Deputy's Speech, Define a Dilemma, MED. MKTG.
MEDIA, Oct. 1996, at 12.
154. See, e.g., DrugFirmto PleadGuilty to Lying to FDA Officials,ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb.
28,1991, at A17 (reporting pharmaceutical company admission that it sold adulterated, mislabeled

medicine).
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Koberstein observes that pharmaceutical companies face pressure to
support potentially harmful off-label uses of highly profitable drugs.15 5 He
notes that soaring sales heighten potential conflicts because
"[b]lockbusters rule the world of pharmaceuticals, and no company wishes
to risk the fortunes of a star. ' 156 If pressures on successful companies
encourage either support for or at least tolerance of risky off-label
practices, imagine the effect of pressures on companies that are performing
precariously.
ii. Doctors' Conflicts
Doctors likewise face a number of potential conflicts of interest that
may encourage the imprudent prescription of drugs for off-label use. Some
pharmaceutical companies, despite the objections of ethicists and other
critics,15 7 continue to confer gratuities of varying value on physiciansss
who, as a group, are the legally required intermediaries necessary for the
prescription of the companies' products.159 Doctors who accept tokens
from drug manufacturers place themselves in potential positions of either
blatant or subtle indebtedness, a process capable of clouding judgment in
the treatment of patients. 16°
Doctors face a second variety of pressure from patients, who come to
them not only with conditions, but also with pre-established ideas of the
medications they expect to receive.1 61 While this source of pressure on

155. See Wayne Koberstein, Living Off-Label, PHARM. EXEC., May 1997, at 12.
156. Id.
157. SeeAdvertising, MarketingandPromotionalPracticesofthe PharmaceuticalIndustry:
HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Laborand HumanResources, 101 st Cong., 2d Sess. at 159
(1990) (testimony of AMA House of Delegates Vice Speaker Dr. Daniel H. Johnson, questioning
"undue influence from a gift... with strings attached").
158. See Susan Heilbronner Fisher, Note, The Economic Wisdom of Regulating
Pharmaceutical "Freebies," 1991 DUKE L.J. 206, 210, 211-12 (noting that pharmaceutical
company "retailers" often treat physicians to meals and "freebies," and pharmaceutical companies
pay physicians substantial honoraria to speak at company-sponsored conferences and mention the
sponsor's product); John C. Nelson, A Snorkel a 5-Iron, anda Pen, 264 JAMA 742 (1990) (noting
conferral by drug companies of free resort vacations to physicians and spouses).
Drugs:
159. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Rethinking ConsciousDesignLiabilityforPrescription
The Restatement (Third) StandardVersus a NegligenceApproach, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 76,84
(1994) (noting physician prescription requirement for many drugs and medical devices).
160. See David Orentlicher, The Influence of a Professional Organization on Physician
Behavior, 57 ALa. L. REV. 583, 593 (1994) (noting increased tendency in recent years for
pharmaceutical companies to provide gifts that are "particularly likely to influence the treatment
decisions of physicians").
161. See, e.g., Cheryl Clark, Drug Commercials: A Prescriptionfor Trouble?, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., July 20, 1998, at Al (describing patient who said to doctor, "I'he ad said I should be
on Pravachol. How come you didn't put me on that?").
As one commentator notes, when a pharmaceutical product becomes a resounding success,
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doctors has always existed, and of course is at some level unavoidable, it
is also heightened today by several factors. The FDA recently loosened its

restrictions on manufacturers' direct advertising of prescription drugs to

consumers. 62 As a result, today's patients are bombarded by the efforts of
pharmaceutical manufacturers to spur user demand. 63 Commercials that

end with the phrase, "If you have condition X, see your doctor about
treatment Y," can be expected to exacerbate the pressures patients place on
physicians. 164
Combine this phenomenon with the more generic overall growth and
increasing public accessibility of a wealth of information through the
development of various media. As cable and satellite channels, periodicals,
and Internet sites grow in number and as more subscribers gain access to
their abundant information, 65 more patients are likely to arrive at their
doctors' offices with preconceived ideas of the treatments they expect. The
result over time is an increasingly empowered population of patients. Of
course, this trend will have some positive side effects, such as protecting
patient rights and enabling patients to be more informed participants in
their own treatment. On the other side, however, is the inevitability that
better-informed, empowered patients will become more demanding,
placing greater pressures on doctors to prescribe particular drug treatments.
As they face larger numbers of imperious patients whose patronage
provides their livelihood, doctors will have to be very
strong to resist
l6
treatments.
off-label
requested
prescribe
to
pressures
"[s]tar-struck customers rush in like moths to a flame." Koberstein, supra note 155, at 12.
162. See 62 Fed. Reg. 21,684 and 21,685 (1997).
163. See Michael Lasalandra, Advertised Drugs Find Patient Following, BOSTON HERALD,
Mar. 15, 1998, at 21 (noting heavy television and general circulation magazine advertising of
certain prescription drugs).
164. As examined in Part I discussing the precise limits of the Modernization Act, drug
manufacturers are permitted to promote off-label uses only to a specified group of practitioners and
other professionals, and not directly to patients. See infra note 185. This fact, while certainly
relevant to the discussion here, does not remove the concerns that pressures placed on physicians
by patients are growing. Even though pharmaceutical companies cannot market off-label uses
directly to consumers, they can market labeled uses, and the off-label alterations will frequently
treat the same disease, condition, or symptoms. Moreover, while the manufacturers cannot tout the
off-label variants, others can and do, over web pages on the Internet, or through word of mouth. As
direct-to-consumer advertising of closely related labeled uses are combined with an increasingly
open marketplace for the exchange of information, many consumers can and will learn a lot about
off-label applications and place demands for such applications on their health care providers.
165. See Michael H. Cohen, HolisticHealth Care: IncludingAlternative and Complementary
Medicine in Insurance and Regulatory Schemes, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 140 n.416 (1996) (noting
information access via technology is transforming peoples' response to disease, particularly in terms
of increased autonomy).
166. An example ofthis phenomenon is the off-label prescription of fenterminein combination
with the prescription drug phenfluramine, as part of the widely touted blockbuster that was
commonly called "fen-phen" during the middle 1990s. As word of mouth spread regarding the
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iii. Scientists' Conflicts
Even scientists, presumably insulated from such conflicts of interests,
lack complete objectivity. One obvious problem is promotion of off-label
uses by scientists with undisclosed financial ties to manufacturers. 67 Such

scientists have the same monetary conflict of interests as the manufacturers
with whom they are associated.
Even scientists with no hidden investments or direct stakes in a
manufacturing company may encourage off-label drug uses that tend to
highlight the importance of their research. Altman observes, "scientists,
proud of their research that showed a new therapy worked, often encourage
off-label use to enhance their reputations."' 8 As in the case of both
manufacturers and physicians, scientists are in a position that raises a
conflict of interest.
Of course, we cannot ignore the powerful professional ethos that
encourages scientists to be objective and rigorous in the application of
unbiased methodologies.'69 Yet we likewise cannot ignore the demands of
a highly competitive profession in which researchers strive to become
stars. 171 Scientists too frequently are charged with fraud in the execution
of their experiments. 17' In this setting, competitive pressures that lure

effectiveness of this treatment, patients went to physicians in large numbers asking for fen-phen.
In all likelihood, many or most of the patients looking for fen-phen were unaware that the treatment
was an off-label combination that had never received the FDA's sanction. Moreover, the patients
who went to their doctors in droves requesting this particular treatment placed pressure on those
practitioners to prescribe a very popular but nonetheless controversial drug combination, about
which many of the doctors had reason to be concerned. Logic tells us that some of these doctors
were affected by patient pressure and demands in exercising their best judgment. In the wake of the
removal of fenfluramine from the market in 1997, the hazards of conflicts of interest facing
physicians is apparent. For more detailed discussion of this example, see supra notes 130-39 and
accompanying text.
167. See Donald M. Payne, ConsuersatRisk:Off-Label Uses ofMedicalDrugsandDevices,
TRIAL, Aug. 1993, at 26 (reporting "improper promotion" of acne treatment for off-label uses by
scientists who had hidden financial ties to the manufacturer).
168. Lawrence K. Altman, GoodNewsjfrom the Frontin the WarAgainstCancer,N.Y. TIMES,
May 26, 1998, at F3.
169. Ethical mandates exist in both business and the practice of medicine. As these mandates
do not remove conflict of interest problems in these contexts, so they cannot eliminate conflict of
interest problems even in the highly structured world of scientific research. While we hope and
believe that the existence of ethical precepts will reduce the incidence of self-serving behaviors that
are likely to harm others, we would be naive to believe that the principles of any profession always
serve this function.
170. For discussion ofthe extremely competitive nature of scientific research, see Salbu, supra
note 99, at 445-46.
171. See, e.g., Imre Karacs, Love in the Lab of the Gods, INDEPENDENT (LONDON), July 2,
1997, at 2 (discussing charges against an eminent scientist of "systematic forgery," "faking
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professionals from absolute purity and objectivity are an inescapable
reality.172 Scientists face incentives not only to encourage off-label
applications consistent with their own findings, but also to skew either data
analysis or data interpretation in the direction of promising new treatments,
the proliferation of which might raise their stature in the scientific and
medical communities. 73
e. Responses to the Free Speech Arguments of
Off-Label Marketing Proponents
Opponents of off-label advertising and promotion can challenge the
free speech arguments of proponents by asserting that commercial speech
rights are limited, that the entirely uncontrolled flow of ideas in the
medical and allied health communities can be socially harmful in certain
limited instances, and that existing restrictions are limited and therefore
reasonable. 74 Specifically, they can contend that companies are not
precluded under the Modernization Act from advertising off-label uses;
they simply must comply with the statute's safeguards to do so.'
Whereas open discussion of high-quality, reliable research findings can
foster medical advances, the same may not hold true as the quality
deteriorates. At the extreme, the dissemination of unreliable data or
irresponsibly conducted research could lead to potentially deadly medical
practices. Free speech proponents likely will reply that quackery is best
countered by challenge and debate rather than by stifling the flow of
information. 76 Still, limited quality control over marketing practices of
manufacturers, in the interest of consumer protection, is not the same as
absolute censorship over noncommercial exchanges of ideas. The dangers
of the former restriction arguably are less formidable than the dangers of
the latter, and the protection in question could preserve human safety in an
environment characterized by complex information that is difficult to
evaluate under the best of circumstances.
Public Citizen has issued statements over the Internet that challenge
both the motives and the effects of the reform, highlighting the commercial
nature of the speech in question. In one such release, the highly regarded
academic Dr. Arnold S. Relman contends that drug manufacturers have

experiments," and "defrauding public institutions to the tune of possibly millions of marks").
172. See Philip M. Boffey, Rise in Science Fraudis Seen; Need to Win Citedas a Cause,N.Y.
TIMEs, May 30, 1985, at B5 (noting agreement of medical professionals and journal editors that
fierce competition in science provokes fraud and deception, undermining the integrity of scientific
research).
173. See Altman, supra note 168.
174. See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
175. For discussion of these safeguards, see infra Part IV.
176. For more discussion of the "marketplace of ideas" approach, see infra Part IV.
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pressed for the change in law simply in order to make even more money
than they have made in the past.177 He observes that doctors "don't need
their mailbox[es] full of high-powered marketing materials from drug
companies urging them to use a drug for uses that have not been
approved." '7 8 According to Dr. Relman, either credible evidence of the
safety and effectiveness for such unapproved uses of the drugs is lacking,
or else the manufacturers simply have not bothered to present existing data
to the FDA.179 Under either condition, the public might reasonably be
skeptical about such uses of prescription drugs. Indeed, FDA panels have
periodically assessed common off-label uses and found them to be
ineffective or dangerous, culminating in a recommendation that the drug's
labeling be revised to include warnings against the off-label use at issue. 80
How high, then, is the social cost of requiring FDA safety and
effectiveness approval prior to the promotion of off-label uses? Critics see
the risks of off-label marketing as substantial, and the imposition on
speech rights as constrained and reasonable. Inherent in their arguments is
the notion that limited regulation of commercial speech is more than
justified by the anticipated savings in health and lives.
III. THE FOOD AND DRUG MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1997:
PROVISIONS RELATING TO OFF-LABEL PROMOTION
AND MARKETING OF DRUGS

For the first time in recent years, drug manufacturers are permitted by
statute to engage in the off-label marketing and promotion of the drugs
they produce, subject to a variety of legislative constraints.'81 The authority
to do so was established in the Modernization Act,182 passed by Congress

177. See Public Citizen, Statement of Dr.Arnold S. Relman, Editor-in-ChiefEmeritus,New
EnglandJournalofMedicine;ProfessorEmeritus,HarvardMedicalSchool, on S.830, The Senate
FDA Bill, Sept. 23, 1997, (visited Feb. 3, 1998)
<http://www.citizen.org/public-citizen/congress/fda/S.%20830-FDA/relman.htm>.
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. See, e.g., Michael F. Conlan, One Calcium-ChannelBlocker Form FlaggedBy FDA
Advisors, DRUG TOPICS, Feb. 19, 1996, at 48 (noting FDA advisory panel's recommendation that
labeling of shortacting or immediate-release nifedipine be revised to warn physicians against offlabel use for particular conditions).
181. Because proponents of the freedom to engage in off-label marketing view the legislative
constraints as severeimpediments, they continue to challenge the existence of any and all regulatory
and legislative rules in court. A recent district court decision has supported their position. See
Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998). If future district courts
and appellate courts concur, it is possible that some or all of the statutory constraints that presently
encumber absolutely free off-label marketing could be judicially lifted.
182. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997,21 U.S.C. § 301 (1997).
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in 1997 amidst political maneuvering and bargaining, 11 much of which
was a roller-coaster ride for the off-label advertising provisions.'4 The
Subparts below include an introduction to the basic changes contained in
these provisions of the legislation, and a discussion of the various
provisions and contingencies that constrain the absolute freedom of
manufacturers in the marketing of off-label applications.
A. An Introduction to the Basic Changes Contained in the
ModernizationAct's Off-Label Marketing Provisions
The Modernization Act permits manufacturers to disseminate to a
number of groups, including (1) health care practitioners, (2) pharmacy
benefit managers, (3) health insurance issuers, (4) group health plans, and
(5) federal or state governmental agencies, qualified forms of "written
information concerning the safety, effectiveness, or benefit of a use not
described in the approved labeling of a drug or device... .""' To qualify
under this provision, a manufacturer of a drug must either have filed an
application or have received a biologics license for the drug under
appropriate provisions of the Public Health Service Act." 6
This generic description of the legislative provisions seems to suggest
that companies are allowed to engage freely in the marketing of off-label
applications. Critics of the reform say this is not the case. They contend
that the legislation's detailed requirements are prohibitive. 87 The Subparts
below cover the major constraining provisions of the legislation-ancillary
requirements that arguably stifle the technically permissible off-label
They include an "authorized information"
marketing of drugs.'
restriction, the supplemental application requirement, disclosure
requirements, and a provision allowing for corrective actions.

183. For discussion of this process in regard to the Modernization Act, see James G.
Dickinson, Winning on the Washington Yo-Yo, MED. MKTG. &MEDIA, Sept. 1997, at 10.
184. See James G. Dickinson, Marketers Miss Out Again on CapitolHill, MED. MKTG.&
MEDIA, July 1997, at 10.
185. 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(a) (1997).
186. See iL § 360aaa(b)(1)(A).
187. See Jack Angel, Highlights(andPitfalls)ofthe FDA Reform Bill, MED. MKTG. &MEDIA,
Jan. 1998, at 48 (noting concern, in regard to the Modernization Act's off-label provisions,
"whether anyone would ever run this gauntlet... ").
188. Although critics contend the constraining provisions have this stifling effect, consumer
safety advocates and the FDA can counter that the restrictions are required to protect the public
from poor quality research, and biased or contaminated data.
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B. The Authorized InformationRestriction
Qualified manufacturers are permitted to provide to the enumerated

groups"9 only "authorized information"" inthe form of unabridged peer-

reviewed articles 9 ' or qualified reference publications." 2 Among the more
controversial limitations' 93 is a provision that restricts qualified peer-

189. See 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(a) (1997).
190. Id. § 360aaa-1(a).
191. See id. § 360aaa-l(a)(1)(A). Specifically, the statute defines this as
an unabridged... reprint or copy of an article, peer-reviewed by experts qualified
by scientific training or experience to evaluate the safety or effectiveness of the
drug or device involved, which was published in a scientific or medical journal...
which is about a clinical investigation with respect to the drug or device, and
which would be considered to be scientifically sound by such experts ....
Id. The statute defines a "scientific or medical journal" as
a scientific or medical publication... that is published by an organization... that
has an editorial board;... that utilizes experts, who have demonstrated expertise
in the subject of an article under review by the organization and who are
independent of the organization, to review and objectively select, reject, or
provide comments about proposed articles; and ...that has a publicly stated
policy, to which the organization adheres, of full disclosure of any conflict of
interest or biases for all authors or contributors involved with the journal or
organization;... whose articles are peer-reviewed and published in accordance
with the regular peer-review procedures of the organization; ... that is generally
recognized to be of national scope and reputation;... that is indexed in the Index
Medicus of the National Library of Medicine of the National Institutes of Health;
and.., that is not in the form of a special supplement that has been funded in
whole or in part by one or more manufacturers.
Id. § 360aaa-5(5).
at 360aaa-l(b). The statute defines a "reference publication" as
192. See id.
a publication that.., has not been written, edited, excerpted, or published
specifically for, or at the request of, a manufacturer of a drug or device;... has
not been edited or significantly influenced by such a manufacturer,... is not
solely distributed through such a manufacturer but is generally available in
bookstores or other distribution channels where medical textbooks are sold;...
does not focus on any particular drug or device of a manufacturer that
disseminates information under section 360aaa and does not have a primary focus
on new uses of drugs or devices that are marketed or under investigation by a
manufacturer supporting the dissemination of information; and. . . presents
materials that are not false or misleading.
Id.
193. Groups such as the Coalition of Health Care Communicators believe that the limitation
is overly restrictive. In 1996, they proposed to the FDA that off-label marketing be permitted
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review articles to those "indexed in the Index Medicus of the National
Library of Medicine of the National Institutes of Health,"194 a requirement
that restricts qualified information to an arguably elite group of
publications.195 To be disseminated, the information cannot have been
"derived from research conducted by another manufacturer," unless "the
manufacturer disseminating the information has the permission of such
other manufacturer to make the dissemination.""
Sixty days prior to disseminating the information, the manufacturer
must furnish the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) a
copy of the information it plans to distribute, as well as clinical trial
information the manufacturer has regarding the off-label use's safety and
effectiveness. 97 The manufacturer also must forward to the Secretary any
reports it has concerning the safety and effectiveness of the off-label use.198
C. The Supplemental Application Requirement
The legislation addresses one of the critics' concerns that we observed
earlier 9 -the fear that off-label marketing could endanger the public by
discouraging research on new uses of approved products. Specifically,
critics have suggested that permitting manufacturers to engage in off-label
marketing logically reduces or eliminates their incentive to study the safety
and effectiveness of off-label uses.2'
Although free-market adherents might contend that this problem is
illusory,"1 the statute nevertheless addresses the concern by requiring the

provided the materials distributed were prepared independently of the manufacturer, were peerreviewed, were not selectively abridged or edited to skew the information in the manufacturer's
favor, were prominently identified as concerning off-label uses, and were accompanied by a
recommendation to consult FDA product information prior to prescription. See Off-LabelDrugInfo
DisseminationComes UnderIncreasing Pressure,MED. MKTG. & MEDIA, Mar. 1996, at 6.
194. 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-5(b) (1997).
195. See James G. Dickinson, Tiny ConcessionSplits Industry, MED. MKrG.& MEDIA, Nov.
1997, at 12 (noting statutory restriction and its omission to include the output of many smaller
publishers).
196. 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(b)(3) (1997).
197. See id.§ 360aaa(b)(4).
198. See id.
199. See supra Section Il(c)(2)(c).
200. See U.S. FDA on Disseminationof Off-Label Use Info, MARKETLETR, June 15, 1998,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File (noting concerns that permitting manufacturers to
disseminate information about off-label applications would reduce their incentives to create efficacy
and safety data concerning the off-label uses).
201. See, e.g., Peter Huber, FDA Caution Can Be Deadly, Too, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1998,
at A14 (suggesting that the entire regulatory process is not needed to ensure that companies engage
in responsible testing of drug products because "[n]o private company prospers for long selling
products that kill, maim, or injure," and therefore rational drug companies will engage in sufficient
research of their products without political prodding).
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manufacturer to submit a supplemental application for off-label use,'
effectively mandating that the manufacturer follow its off-label marketing
programs with the standard research procedures that would apply to a new
drug.' °3 The statute also provides, however, for exemption from the
supplemental application requirement, 4 which can be granted if the
Secretary finds that "it would be economically prohibitive with respect to
[the drug] ...for the manufacturer to incur the costs necessary for the
submission of a supplemental application."2 '5 The exemption provision
purportedly ensures that certain off-label applications are not
systematically denied marketing privileges simply because the
manufacturer is very small or follow-up studies are highly complex and
expensive.206
D. DisclosureRequirements
When the manufacturer sends authorized information to any of the
qualified groups, it must include prominently displayed caveats disclosing
that "the information concerns a use of a drug or device that has not been
approved or cleared by the Food and Drug Administration."' 7 The
manufacturer also must enclose official labeling and labeling updates along
with the authorized information.'
The legislation's disclosure requirements also address the importance
of communicating possible sources of research bias to recipients of offlabel promotional materials. Manufacturers must identify sources of

202. See 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-3(a) (1997).
203. The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, the provisions of which were extended in
the Modernization Act of 1997, helps reduce bureaucratic impediments that once plagued drug
application processes. The statutory provisions charge manufacturers "user fees" at certain stages
in the marketing of their products, which revenues go toward hiring greater numbers of
professionals to process new drug applications. See Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, P.L.
102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (1992) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 379g (1997)).
The User Fee Act (U.F.A.) expedites the processing of both new drug applications and
supplemental applications. As a result, drug manufacturers that want to engage in off-label
marketing may find the supplemental application requirement less daunting, or less of a
disincentive, than under the previously more cumbersome time-frames. See Jill Wechsler,
Labeling'sEbb and Flow, PHARM. EXEC., Feb. 1997, at 20. ("An important... accomplishment
of FDA's user-fee program over the past four years has been to eliminate the backlog of old
supplemental applications and to accelerate the review of new ones.").
204. See 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-3(d)(1) (1997).
205. Id. § 360aaa-3(d)(2).
206. See ChangesforMarketers,PHARM.EXEC., Dec. 1997, at42 ("The agency [FDA] is most
likely to agree to an exception when the sponsor is very small or the required study is very complex
and expensive to conduct.").
207. 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(b)(b)(A)(i) (1997).
208. See id. § 360aaa(b)(b)(A)(iv).
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funding for the research. 2 Moreover, when applicable, they must disclose
the fact that they are paying for dissemination of the information.210
Finally, manufacturers must disclose the existence of any of a group of
enumerated potential conflicts of interest pertaining to the authors of the
information.211
The dissemination requirements also operate to ensure that the
presentation of information be complete, and not slanted or skewed in
favor of the manufacturer's promotion of a particular off-label use. The
information must be accompanied by a bibliography listing other reference
publications or journal articles concerning the use of the drug at issue.21
Moreover, the Secretary has the power to determine that the information
submitted by the manufacturer "fails to provide data, analyses, or other
written matter that is objective and balanced."2 3 In this event, the
Secretary can notify the manufacturer of the determination and require the
manufacturer to disseminate either or both of two additional things:
additional objective, scientific information needed to provide balance, and
a statement by the Secretary regarding safety and effectiveness of the offlabel use.2 14
E. CorrectiveActions
The legislation provides a final safeguard by authorizing "corrective
actions" through which dissemination of off-label information can be
halted. Under the provisions, after the manufacturer begins disseminating
information, it must submit to the Secretary "a notification of any
additional knowledge of the manufacturer on clinical research or other data
that relate to the safety or effectiveness of the new use involved."2 5 If the
Secretary determines from the data that the use may be ineffective or
significantly risky to public health, he or she can issue an order to cease
dissemination.216 The Secretary also can order cessation of dissemination
if a manufacturer fails to comply with various statutory requirements, 217 or
if problems exist pertaining to the supplemental application2 8 or its

209. See id. § 360aaa(b)(b)(A)(vi).
210. See id. § 360aaa(b)(b)(A)(ii).
211. See id. § 360aaa(b)(b)(A)(iii). Specifically, the manufacturer must provide "the name of
any authors of the information who are employees of, consultants to, or have received compensation
from, the manufacturer, or who have a significant financial interest in the manufacturer." Id.
212. See id. § 360aaa(b)(b)(B).
213. Id. § 360aaa(c).
214. See id.
215. Id. § 360aaa-4(a)(2).

216. See id § 360aaa-4(a)(1).
217. See id § 360aaa-4(b)(1).
218. See id. § 360aaa-4(b)(2).
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exemption.2 1 9

Overall, the legislation that ultimately passed was viewed by President
Clinton as a compromise between two conflicting considerations.' The
need to enhance access to drugs and medical devices, by giving
professionals greater access to information regarding them, was balanced
with a desire for safeguards sufficient to protect the welfare of
consumers. 1 While the changes permit manufacturers to engage in offlabel marketing of drugs for the first time in recent years, critics consider
the statute's safeguards burdensome and inhibiting.'m Yet despite the
concern over bureaucratic hurdles that are built into the legislated
process," the off-label sections of the Modernization Act are among the
statute's more revolutionary provisions.'
IV. PoucY RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING
OFF-LABEL PROCESSES

The preceding Parts have examined the nature of various off-label
practices, considered the arguments that have been made by supporters and
detractors of the practices, and examined the recent legislative
modifications concerning off-label marketing. What remains is to consider
solutions to the issues that have been raised, and make policy
recommendations for Congress and the FDA as they continue to wrestle
with all sides of this challenge.
The ideological debate over off-label practices can be synthesized into
a few essential observations and recommendations: (A) Off-label
prescription is an essential part of modem medicine, without which stateof-the-art advances would be intolerably retarded; (B) Although the social
value of off-label prescription is mitigated by offsetting risks, restriction
of off-label prescription or the marketing of off-label applications is not the
best means of reducing these risks; (C) Off-label practices should be
liberated from most extant legislative and regulatory constraints, subject
to the following protective mechanisms: (1) full disclosure to physicians;
(2) full disclosure to patients; and (3) retrenchment from some tort-reform
measures that may reduce manufacturers' incentives to test for safety of

219. See id.
§ 360aaa-4(b)(3).
220. See Critics Question FDA Reform, Say Law Will Benefit Big Firms; Obstacles to OffLabel Info Use, MED. MKTG. & MEDIA, Dec. 1997, at 22.

221. See id.
222. See So What?, supra note 105 ('With such restrictions [as the Modernization Act places
on off-label promotions], some product company executives are asking, where's the reform?").
223. See ia.
224. This conclusion is based on the fact a good number of statutory modifications of the
Modernization Act essentially codify FDA regulations and practices that already were in place. For
examples, see Salbu, supra note 13.
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off-label uses and market off-label uses honestly and accurately.
A. Off-Label PrescriptionIs an EssentialPartofModern
Medicine, Without Which State-of-the-Art
Advances Would Be IntolerablyRetarded
Whatever costs, risks, or other disadvantages might be associated with
off-label prescription of drugs, two facts appear to be indisputable. First,
some of the most effective drug treatments in existence today are off-label
treatments.' Suppose we denied HLV and AIDS patients access to
combination therapy until the combinations were tested and approved
under the procedures the FDA uses for new drugs. Thousands of patients
who have thrived using the unapproved cocktails would have met the same
fate as patients before the advent of protease inhibitors-they would have
deteriorated quickly, suffered terrible illnesses, and died.226
Second, off-label prescription creates unique opportunities to witness
the effects of new applications over the widest possible population and
during the shortest possible period. Unfettered access to an entire
population of patients provides an unrestricted, admittedly informal
laboratory, thereby hastening medical advances. Again, the case of offlabel combination therapies for HIV and AIDS patients is exemplary. The
costs and benefits of combination treatments will be revealed more quickly
among the universe of patients than among a small sample of patients, and
by a wide array of doctors rather than a handful of scientific investigators.
Off-label prescription thus maximizes information and increases the speed
with which it is amassed. Likewise, it multiplies the number of minds that
will look at the information, apply different perspectives, and develop
hypotheses, theories, and principles regarding a new treatment. The logical
result of these dynamics should be to propel the state of the art of medical
practice.
Of course, the arguments in Subpart II.C.2. remind us that the
advantages of off-label prescription come at a cost. Indeed, critics simply
look at the same half glass of water and describe it from a different
perspective. Proponents extol speed, contending it gives patients access to
effective new treatments and advances medical knowledge; opponents
rebuke speed, arguing it puts patients at risk from harmful, unproven new
treatment applications. Whether speed is good or bad depends on whether
the treatment that is hastened turns out to be good or bad. The following
Subpart addresses this problem, suggesting that the substantial benefits of

225. See supra Subpart I.C.l.a.
226. See Linda C. Fentiman, AIDS as a ChronicIllness:A CautionaryTalefor the Endof the
Twentieth Century, 61 ALB. L. REV. 989, 990-91 (1998) (noting role of protease inhibitors in
extending lives of HIV and AIDS patients).
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off-label prescription-and by extension, of off-label marketing-cannot
be discarded. It also argues that the risks and costs of the practices must be
addressed rather than ignored, but without recourse to a ban or quasi-ban
that chills public discourse regarding scientific and medical information.
B. Although the Social Value of Off-Label PrescriptionIs Mitigated
by Offsetting Risks, Restriction of Off-Label Prescriptionor
the Marketing of Off-Label ApplicationsIs Not the
Best Means of Reducing These Risks
The benefits of off-label prescription are compelling enough to support
two observations. First, we should not prohibit off-label prescription
practices if there are any less restrictive means of reasonably protecting the
public's interest in safety. Second, because off-label prescription is crucial
to the effective treatment of patients and the advancement of medicine,
communications regarding off-label practices should be considered crucial
by extension. The ability of off-label applications to achieve their potential
depends upon the rapid dissemination of information throughout the
medical community.
These observations suggest that we should try to protect the public
without banning off-label medical applications or chilling discussion of
them. This challenge calls for creative, nontraditional solutions. The
recommendations in the following Subpart minimize regulatory
intervention and maximize exploitation of market forces as a relatively
unintrusive method of public protection.
A couple of observations must be made regarding these less restrictive
alternatives. First, because they protect the public in a different manner
than direct legislative and regulatory bans, some of the specific
beneficiaries and victims will change. People whose health would be
spared by a ban might die under a market forces approach. Likewise,
people who might die under a ban might be spared under a market forces
approach. This simply reflects the fact that different methods attack the
problem differently, and the winners and losers under alternative systems
will not always be the same people.
Second, Ipropose a market-based approach under the belief that, ceteris
paribus,more lives and health will be preserved than under the regulatory
system presently in place. It is possible, perhaps even likely, that the
alternatives proposed will provide less public protection against the risks
of off-label prescription and marketing than stringent bureaucratic controls.
Even if a degree of protection is sacrificed, the invaluable benefits of offlabel practices outweigh some loss in the preservation of public safety
from unproven applications. As in the preceding paragraph, the individuals
who gain and lose under the existing approach and under my approach
often will vary. I suggest only that the proposed method is likely to
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increase the number of winners over losers.
C. Off-Label PracticesShould Be Liberatedfrom
Most Legislative andRegulatory Constraints,
Subject to Several ProtectiveMechanisms
All three off-label practices identified in Part 1--off-label use, off-label
prescription, and off-label marketing to physicians-should be broadly
permissible and free from bureaucratic constraint. This means that use and
prescription should remain legally and socially accepted practice, and that
marketing of off-label applications should be unfettered from some of the
more burdensome, less justifiable restrictions contained in the
Modernization Act.
Not all of the Act's provisions are dysfunctional. The restriction of offlabel marketing to qualified professional groups is reasonable, particularly
given the relative breadth of recipients under the provisions.27 Other
justifiable provisions of the Act are largely those that support market force
protections by increasing available information through disclosure
requirements. For example, requiring manufacturers to disclose that an offlabel application hasn't been approved by the FDA ' is easy, inexpensive,
and useful. Disclosure of funding sources 9 likewise is easy to do and
serves a potentially important function. Indeed, disclosure of information
is so central a part of market-based protection that I recommend additional
disclosure requirements in Subparts IV.C.1. and 2. below.
Other disclosure requirements are at least somewhat more onerous to
manufacturers, and while they do serve useful informative functions, they
are a bit more controversial because they add a moderate hurdle to offlabel marketing endeavors. I refer here to the requirements to provide
bibliographies of other reference publications and journal articles on a
subject, 23 ° and to provide on request of the Secretary balanced, objective,
scientific information regarding an off-label use.2 t
While these disclosure requirements impose preparation, labor, and
therefore costs on manufacturers, these burdens are ultimately justifiable.
A manufacturer exercising reasonable care in creating its marketing
materials will do a methodical search of the literature, ascertain that it has
seen all relevant findings, and weigh conflicting findings carefully before
promoting a particular off-label use. Since all these activities are essential
227. Qualified recipients include health care practitioners, pharmacy benefit managers, health
insurance issuers, group health plans, and federal and state governmental agencies. See supra note
185 and accompanying test.
228. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
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to reasonably careful marketing efforts, we can assume that reporting the
information is simply pro forma for any responsible company.
A number of the Act's other restrictions, however, create such
cumbersome hurdles to the dissemination of information that companies
are likely to forego promoting innovative uses of FDA-approved drugs.
Taken together, these requirements will discourage companies from
disseminating potentially valuable information about their products.
Unjustifiable impediments include the supplemental application
requirement and the authorized information restriction.
The supplemental application provision of the Modernization Act
requires companies that are not exempted to file a supplemental
application or a certification of intent to submit a supplemental application
in order to begin off-label marketing. 2 This is a substantial bureaucratic
hurdle, potentially capable of rendering the off-label marketing provisions
of the Act virtually inoperative. While the provisions would indeed ensure
that companies investigate off-label applications, they are burdensome and
unnecessary. The market-oriented alternatives recommended later in this
Part can substitute effectively for the supplemental application
requirement. Retrenchment from the irrational tort reform measure of
punitive damage caps will establish effective manufacturer incentives to
act responsibly and investigate off-label uses. Stepped-up disclosure
requirements will empower both professionals and patients to make
informed decisions regarding any residual risks that cannot be eliminated.
The authorized information restriction systematically disqualifies
potentially valuable research from being the subject of off-label
promotions. A company cannot inform doctors about respectable and
informative findings published in a peer-reviewed journal not indexed in
the Index Medicus.
This chilling effect is unnecessary. Since we are limiting the liberation
of off-label marketing to efforts aimed at physicians and other qualified
health professionals, we are restricting the flow of information to a select
and highly educated group. They are capable of collecting information on
all sides of an issue. Moreover, methods are available to encourage
manufacturers to monitor themselves and restrict their efforts to
responsible promotion activities. The ways in which doctors and
manufacturers can be encouraged to act responsibly, thereby shielding
patients from irresponsibility, are discussed below.
1. Full Disclosure to Physicians
In Part III, we observed that a number of the provisions of the
Modernization Act are intended to compel pharmaceutical companies to
232. See supra Subpart III.C.
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provide balanced, complete disclosure in their off-label marketing
practices. Under the legislation, manufacturers must inform recipients of
a promotion that the information concerns an off-label use.23'They must
include labeling information with the promotion, 2' identify sources of
funding for the research being cited, disclose any conflicts of interest to
which the authors of the information may be subject, 6 and disclose the
fact that the manufacturer is paying for the information's dissemination.237
Finally, the promoting manufacturer must provide a bibliography listing
other reference publications or journal articles regarding the use of the
drug being promoted,23 and otherwise provide data and materials that are
"objective and balanced." 2 9
These requirements are prudent. They help ensure that medical
professionals get a reasonably complete picture of the benefits and risks of
an off-label use, to the extent that they are known. The statutory
requirements place only a minor burden on manufacturers, which should
not be unduly expensive or time-consuming. Moreover, the requirements
reflect the kinds of activities that any careful manufacturer should
undertake before recommending an off-label use. For example, what
prudent manufacturer would recommend an unapproved use of a drug on
the basis of a single study, and decline to find and examine other studies
that might contradict the favorable research? It hardly seems burdensome
to require the manufacturer to find the body of research concerning an offlabel use and provide it to the recipients of its off-label marketing efforts.
2. Full Disclosure to Patients
We noted earlier that, under the learned intermediary doctrine,
physicians serve as a protective layer between manufacturers of
prescription drugs and the patients who take those drugs.' ° Within this
system, manufacturer labeling is directed to physicians rather than to
patients, and physicians exercise broad discretion in terms of the kinds of
relationships they establish with their patients."1 Within the boundaries of

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(b)(b)(A)(i) (1997).
See id. § 360aaa(b)(b)(A)(iv).
See id. § 360aaa(b)(b)(A)(vi).
See id § 360aaa(b)(b)(A)(iii).
See id § 360aaa(b)(b)(A)(ii).
See id. § 360aaa(b)(b)(B).
Id. § 360aaa(c).
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.

241. Of course, a relationship takes two, and patients can play a role in determining the part
they will play in their treatments. Nonetheless, given that the doctor is the professional, that patients
can be intimidated by the context they are in and their relative ignorance, and that the doctor has
a home field relational advantage, we would expect doctors ordinarily to play the dominant role in
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acceptable medical practice, doctors can keep patients highly informed and
make patients active decision-makers in the course of their treatment. 242
Likewise, doctors can adopt a more controlling posture, under which the
patient is treated like an object to be passively processed and fixed.243
Because the patient-as-object model has become so prevalent, many
patients have grown to expect doctors simply to administer treatments and
provide palliatives or cures.2' Indeed, the autonomy of doctors in
fashioning legally acceptable doctor-patient relationships is so broad that
omission to inform patients that their treatments are off-label treatments
is a common, lawful practice.245
Given the advanced state of medical practice and the complexity of
medical information, some degree of physician discretion in patient
treatment is unavoidable. In this context, however, it is hardly surprising
that a bureaucratic structure has developed to protect patients from harmful
and unproven treatments. Nonetheless, at least some administrative patient
protections, in the form of FDA rules and regulations, might logically be
replaced by augmenting the amount and kinds of information given to
patients, and then shifting more responsibility onto them to make treatment
decisions in their own best interest.
When there is serious opposition to an administrative approach to
consumer protection, it therefore makes sense to try to find ways to replace
the objectionable regulations with increased consumer disclosure and
increased consumer autonomy in making potentially difficult choices. In
the case of off-label practices, the interests of free speech and medical
advancement support this approach. Other recommended protections in
this Part should encourage both manufacturers and doctors to restrict their
off-label practices to responsible ones. Once these mechanisms are in place
to limit the kinds of off-label practices likely to pervade the marketplace, 2'
defining the physician-patient relationship.
242. See Carl E. Schneider, Bioethics With a Human Face, 69 IND. L.J. 1075, 1087 (1994)
(discussing patient sovereignty and the role of patient as an active participant in determining the
course of treatment).
243. For a chilling description of a patient being processed by the medical establishment, see
DIANE JOHNSON, HEALTH AND HAPPINESS (1990).
244. See Vemellia R. Randall, Managed Care, Utilization Review, and FinancialRisk
Shifting: Compensating PatientsforHealth Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17 PUGET SOUND L.
REv.1 (1993).
245. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
246. The effectiveness of informed decision-making and consent as a substitute for regulatory
protections depends on the implementation of the other measures recommended in this Part, or
alternative measures that achieve the same ends. Informing patients and then shifting to them the
right and responsibility to direct their treatments will not protect patients from drugs that are
prematurely marketed. If drugs are marketed too early, patients will be forced to make decisions
based on disclosure that the risks are unknown, and some risk-prone patients will be harmed.
Accordingly, disclosure and consent elements of the proposed reform must be supported by
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it is time to shift decision-making authority to informed patients. This is
best achieved by requiring doctors to tell patients that their off-label
treatments have not been approved by the FDA, to explain the known risks
and potential benefits, and then to permit the patients to decide whether to
undertake a treatment. In addition to supporting the commercial speech
rights of manufacturers and the efficient progress of medical advancement,
this approach empowers patients and erodes what can be an insultingly
paternalistic institution that treats patients more as objects than as active
participants in their own treatments.
3. Retrenchment from Some Tort-Reform Measures that May Reduce
Manufacturers' Incentives to Test for Safety of Off-Label Uses and
Market Off-Label Uses Honestly and Accurately
I have suggested that the interests of free speech and medical progress
outweigh patient safety concerns in the off-label marketing debate, at least
if measures other than a marketing ban can mitigate consumer risks. It
bears remembering, however, that the concerns identified by off-label
marketing opponents are legitimate and serious. Whenever we try to hasten
patient access to new treatments, we do so at the risk of exposing patients
to undiscovered dangers.
The pharmaceutical companies wishing to market their products
without interference express compelling First Amendment rights that
should not be denied. Given the potential costs and dangers of off-label
promotion, however, the companies must take responsibility for their
marketing endeavors. Realistically, this responsibility translates into tort
liability for incomplete product testing, premature product distribution, and
off-label product promotion based on incomplete or unreliable data. The
message is simple-if you want to promote what have been accurately cast
as experimental uses of FDA-approved drugs,247 be prepared to pay in the
event that you fail to exercise reasonable care in doing so.
Of course, liability cannot undo a serious physical injury or death. The
knowledge that liability is imminent will serve, however, to deter
companies from premature or inaccurate off-label promotion activities,
thereby lowering the instance of irresponsible marketing tactics. Ordinary
tort liability, in the form of compensatory damages awarded for negligence,
is of course one potential deterrent to carelessness in promotion activities.
In addition, a rigorous punitive damages policy can go far to ensure
manufacturer diligence.

incentives such as manufacturer liability policies that hold pharmaceutical companies accountable
for their actions.
247. See supra Subpart II.C.2.b.
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Specifically, some recent irrational components of tort reform2 , should
be modified to give manufacturers compelling incentives to exercise care
in creating fair, balanced, and responsible advertising campaigns.
Unjustifiable constraints on punitive damage awards, in the form of
statutory caps or ceilings, 9 should be abandoned." In states where
punitive damages are limited to a few hundred thousand dollars, regardless
of the severity of a defendant's wrongdoing," 1 manufacturers may believe
they can act irresponsibly with relative impunity. This social condition is
intolerable, as is any social condition in which liberty is unaccompanied
by responsibility for one's actions. If drug manufacturers want the freedom
to market off-label uses of their products, they should accept potentially
strict punitive consequences if they abuse that freedom.
Of course, the standard for civil punishment must be high-punitive
damages should be awarded only in instances of gross negligence,
recklessness, malice, intent to harm, or extreme and outrageous behavior.
Infliction of punitive damages for behaviors less egregious would be unfair
and would discourage the marketing of off-label applications that can be
so valuable to patients and to medical advancement. Sehsible liability
policies should grant full compensation for negligent marketing practices,
and uncapped punitive damages, commensurate with wrongdoing, for
more culpable marketing practices. If manufacturers are subjected to these
sanctions, both they and society at large can benefit from unconstrained
license to market off-label applications responsibly.

248. While arguments are made on both sides of the tort reform issue, persuasive evidence
suggests that the liability crisis and out-of-control jury awards have been largely exaggerated. See,
e.g., Brian T. Beasley, North Carolina'sNew PunitiveDamagesStatute: Who's Being Punished,
Anyway?, 74 N.C. L. REV. 2174,2190 (1996) (citing findings that recent punitive damage awards
have been modest in North Carolina); Steven Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in
PunitiveDamages,75 MINN. L. REV. 1, 31 (1990) (noting data suggesting infrequency of punitive
damage awards in civil cases); Michael L. Rustad, NationalizingTortLaw: The RepublicanAttack
on Women, Blue CollarWorkers and Consumers,48 RUTGERs L. REv. 673,694-95 (1996) (noting
reasonableness of amount and frequency of punitive damages awards).
249. I label statutory ceilings on punitive damages as unjustifiable because the caps have no
bearing on culpability, but are either arbitrary figures or multiples of compensatory damages that
bear no relationship to the function of punishment. For elaboration of the argument that the ceilings
are dysfunctional, see Steven R. Salbu, DevelopingRationalPunitiveDamages Policies:Beyond
the Constitution, 49 FLA. L. REV. 247, 297-300 (1997).

250. These constraints are unjustifiable throughout the economy and should be abandoned in
general, and not just in conjunction with grossly negligent marketing of off-label applications. Offlabel marketing abuses are just one example of how justifiably strong punitive damages policy can
allow us to reduce or eliminate government regulation, by creating market incentives for selfpolicing behavior.
251. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 1987) (capping punitive damages in
Virginia at $350,000).
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V. CONCLUSION

The recommendations in Part IV have been shaped by an overarching,
synthesizing philosophy. Along the lines of First Amendment
jurisprudence, the philosophy begins with the premise that, while
commercial speech regulations need not necessarily comprise the least
restrictive alternative of advancing legitimate government interests, they
also cannot be more burdensome than necessary. 2 - Accordingly, the
interests of doctors and patients in the most rapid diffusion of knowledge
concerning new off-label applications must not be unduly impaired.
Mechanisms to protect patients from the risks of aggressively marketed
off-label uses should respect the free flow of information.
These mechanisms should protect the public by requiring full disclosure
to both doctors and patients, and by holding professionals accountable for
the ramifications of their actions. The proposals that were discussed in Part
IV empower all parties involved-manufacturers, physicians, and
patients-by optimizing the information available to, and in some
instances mandated for, each group. The provider groups-the
manufacturers and the doctors-are then encouraged, through exacting
liability policies, to use the information responsibly to protect patients.
Critics of off-label practices in general, and of off-label promotion
practices specifically, may suggest that these liberalizations, which would
substantially exceed the federal statutory changes of 1997, will come at the
cost of some lives. Indeed, it is very likely that some people who would be
protected from risky off-label applications under more restrictive laws will
be subjected to them under the proposed approach. It is also inevitable that
in some cases, the off-label applications to which they are exposed will be
dangerous and even deadly. Accordingly, some people very likely will be
exposed to products from which they would have been protected under
more stringent regulations. Some will suffer heartbreaking loss of health
or of life as a result.
The safeguards Ipropose--open information access and liberal liability
policies--can avert only some of these hazards. Activists who would
restrict off-label practices aggressively must recall, however, that the
aforementioned costs must be balanced against the benefits to be gained
from liberalized off-label practices. As noted in Part II, much of the state
of the art in medical practice consists of, or first was introduced through,
off-label applications of FDA-approved drugs. The proposals in this article
recognize the tremendous importance of medical progress, as well as the
role of off-label practices in fostering this progress. Accordingly, while the

252. See United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418,430 (1993).
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consumer protections proffered are not as stringent as possible, they are
justifiable and indeed necessary in light of the benefits of off-label
applications.
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